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ABSTRACT:  
 
 In the modern world, sports have become a new form of geopolitical signaling. Countries 
who are entrusted with hosting mega sporting events, from the Olympic Games to the World Cup 
are seen as capable and competent nations. For developing nations, these games can bring 
political legitimacy, as it shows that their respective teams can not only compete in global 
events, but their governments can host safe, secure, and well run events.  
 In this thesis, I will be examining South Africa’s process in bidding, building and hosting 
the 2010 World Cup and the subsequent political and economic effects. South Africa was able to 
leverage the World Cup, as the first African nation to host a major international sporting event, 
to gain not only regional signaling—as it is still the only African nation to host one of these 
events—but place itself in the international spotlight and gain geopolitical legitimacy through its 
successful event.  
 South Africa overall held a fairly successful World Cup, leading to recognition from both 
domestic and international media outlets, while creating an environment that allowed it to 
emerge as a key player in international organizations and elevate itself on the world stage.  
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SECTION I: INTRODUCTION, DEFINITIONS, AND LITERATURE REVIEW 
 Sports have been a crucial part of society since the days of Ancient Greece, and continue 
to be an influential aspect on culture, politics, and the economy. Sports bring people together, 
from banding together citizens of a city to uniting a nation during worldwide events, such as the 
Olympics or the World Cup. These games are a source of pride, as even the smallest nations 
have an opportunity to compete against larger nations on a level playing field.  
 In the same vein, global games can bring prestige to nations, especially developing 
nations in the Global South. Hosting major sporting events gives these nations the ability to be in 
the international spotlight. Nations view hosting these games as a way to be equal with larger 
nations. This places them alongside other host nations that are considered global powers, like 
China, Great Britain, the United States, and Russia, who have emerged as four of the largest 
global players in the 20th and 21st Centuries and all have hosted some form of global sporting 
competition in the past two decades.     
 In this thesis, I look to examine the usage of mega sporting events as political tools, with 
a focus on stadium building and the subsequent economic and political effects. For this, I will be 
using South Africa as an in depth case study to highlight the effects of large scale construction 
projects on the international perspective of a developing nation. In terms of perspective, the 
geopolitical nature of international relations lends itself in a modern world to these global games, 
where these sporting events are a newfound source of soft power relations. Success, and even at 
the bare minimum competence in hosting these games give not only international legitimacy to a 
host nation, but can lead to a swing of confidence for the host, as the citizens can increase their 
domestic self value from the event’s success. South Africa, being awarded the first African mega 
sporting event, can utilize these events for political gain. This lends credibility to South Africa as 
	 Avdellas 2 
a regional power on the continent, as it has established itself as worthy by an international 
organization to host this prestigious event. The primacy of this act, as they were the first African 
nation, lends an even larger effect. Hosts, especially when the hosts are developing nations, are 
able to use these events to showcase economic achievement or project international influence 
through soft power.1  Thus we can see not only the World Cup but all mega sporting events as a 
form of geopolitics and signaling for soft power relations.  
These global games require large scale infrastructure developments, not only with multi-
million dollar stadiums but with roads, transportation, hotels, and other major projects needed to 
host the tremendous influx of tourists. These projects are costly, but do have economic benefits 
for the host nation, as many times these infrastructure developments are long overdue, but unable 
to be built due to more pressing demands. In terms of political economy, the creation of large 
scale sports stadiums, along with the additional infrastructure for hosting these events, puts the 
state in a position to change the dynamic between the individual citizen and both their regional 
and national government.  When thinking about larger effects, we can use this case study to not 
only examine the role of mega construction projects on domestic policy, but on international 
legitimacy. With the increased focus on developing the Global South in the 21st Century, these 
topics must be examined and studied, as nations use these projects to create legitimacy.  
This project can be applied on a larger scale to not only major sporting events in 
developing nations, but to any major construction project that would create an opportunity for 
potential economic change. These economic impacts could lead to political and social changes, 
from stabilizing the government to creating instability and social unrest.  When thinking outside 
of the world of sports, this can apply to any large scale building project that occurs in the Global 
																																																						
1 Cornelissen, “The Geopolitics of Global Aspiration.” 
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South.  From development of tourist minded attractions, such as taxpayer funded public zoos, to 
infrastructure (airports, railroads, bridges, etc.) to dams and other hydroelectric projects, there 
are benefits and consequences from these major building projects.  These programs are intended 
to drive growth as new infrastructure can allow for more growth within the nation, allowing 
more access to not only investment from its citizens but from foreign capital. I believe the data 
found from this research can be applied in a broader sense to these projects, where publicly 
funded projects can have an impact on the regional and national economic outlooks.  These 
projects are growing in the Global South, as the late 20th and early 21st Century has seen a 
massive growth in government funded mega-construction development. Many of these projects 
have faced the same level of public scrutiny as the World Cup venues, as they initially are seen 
as a mismanagement of public funds, as the funds could go towards social programs like 
education or public health initiatives. However, these programs in the long run may have a 
beneficial effect on the nation as a whole that can exceed the investment in the mega 
construction project.  
 In respect to mega construction projects, there has significant construction related to 
these mega construction projects. Within the past few decades, we have seen projects, such as the 
Kuala Lumpur International Airport in Malaysia in 1998 to the stadiums for the World Cups in 
the 21st Century to more contemporary projects, including the Eurasia Tunnel in 2016 connecting 
Europe and Turkey under the Bosphorus strait. Although these projects do occur in Europe and 
North America, there has been significant progress within the developing world. These nations 
are able to use these projects, such as Kuala Lumpar’s airport, to attract more financial 
opportunities for the nation.2 These mega construction projects are built with the intent of long 
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term use and major economic growth, as it is both a signal of modernization, but also a 
legitimate way to upgrade from aging or non-existent systems to high-tech modern 
infrastructures.   
 Mega construction projects face a slew of complex issues issues in order to be fully 
completed. Aside from the financial burden, there are tremendous technological, environmental, 
and cultural issues. Environmentally, these projects generally have a major impact, with a 
tremendous carbon footprint due to the use of heavy machinery during construction and for 
running the building once it is operational. In terms of cultural barriers, these projects generally 
have international development teams, meaning that it is not only local developers planning but 
outside forces that must navigate specific bureaucratic rules for the individual nations.3 In terms 
of World Cups, not only do these stadiums need to be approved by the federal government who 
had applied for the bids via their national sports associations, but for the specific regional and 
local governments. These levels of complexity serve to make sure that the mega construction 
projects follow the codes set, but cause issues for contractors who are on a fixed, shortened 
timeline to build several mega construction projects in roughly a decade. For this thesis 
specifically, I will not be addressing the intricate construction details, nor will I discuss the 
environmental impact of these projects due to the sheer scope of the project. These factors do 
have a tremendous impact on the construction process and subsequently the public opinion and 
political economy of the nation, but I will focus on direct spending and the political and 
economic effects from said investment. 
																																																						
3 He et al., “Measuring the Complexity of Mega Construction Projects in China—A Fuzzy 
Analytic Network Process Analysis.” 
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I plan on focusing on development essential to hosting a major sporting event: The World 
Cup. In this, I plan on using South Africa—host of the 2010 World Cup—as the primary in-
depth case, as South Africa has a complete data set, along with having nearly a decade of 
analysis on the World Cup and its effects. I plan on comparing it to the 2014 Brazilian World 
Cup, as both came from postcolonial backgrounds and have had similar struggles with political 
stability. However, Brazil hosted the World Cup and the Summer Olympics—the two largest 
sporting events in the world—with just over two years separating the 2014 World Cup Final and 
the opening ceremonies of the 2016 Rio Olympics. Due to this factor, it is extremely difficult to 
parse the effects of the World Cup from the effects of the Olympics, especially with shared 
infrastructure and stadiums. Within the past decade, both Brazil and South Africa have been 
considered BRICS nations, an association of five major emerging regional powers and national 
economies. These two nations, along with Russia, India, and China, represent over 40% of the 
global population and roughly 23% of the gross world product.  BRICS nations have hosted the 
past three World Cups, from South Africa in 2010 to Russia in 2018, along with China hosting 
the 2008 Summer Olympics and India hosting the Commonwealth Games in 2010. Both have 
relatively similar Gross Domestic Product (GDP) with Brazil’s $15,600 per capita GDP and 
South Africa’s $13,500 being ranked at 110th and 119th respectively.4 Both nations are currently 
dealing with major political issues, as there have been marked scandals for both nations within 
the past decade but their political climates are stabilizing with elections in 2018 restoring 
confidence in the governments of both nations.  
 For stadiums specifically, there has been a tremendous amount of literature, especially in 
terms of these two contemporary World Cups. Prior scholars have analyzed the political and 
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economic impacts of major sporting events, with these instances becoming more frequent due to 
the 2018 World Cup—which brought attention back to South Africa and Brazil—and the 
growing issues with the 2022 World Cup in Qatar, which will be held in the winter due to the 
unplayable heat during the summer in the Arab Peninsula, and in regards to alleged human rights 
violations with their construction projects, as migrant workers are dying at an alarming rate, with 
estimates stating over 1,200 migrant workers have died during construction of the eight new 
stadiums.5 Thus during the period between the 2018 Cup in Russia and the 2022 Cup in Qatar, 
many theorists have been able to look at the 2010 and 2014 Cups with better data sets and 
analyze their longer term effects.  
 In terms of the economic impacts of construction and the subsequent benefits from the 
games being played at the stadium, there have been mixed results, with many experts stating that 
the economic impacts are based on assumptions that cannot be examined. Theories, such as those 
evoked by William Hunter, a former professor of economics at Marquette University, state that 
the multipliers used for the calculations of economic impacts are flawed, as they give a gross 
product rather than a net gain.6 Theorists also suggest the opportunity costs, as these stadiums 
take up a significant geographic footprint, while other buildings can take the same space and 
have potentially larger and more long lasting impacts on the community. For example, the city of 
Denver was projected to return $16.5 million annually in gaining the Colorado Rockies franchise 
and building Coors Field in 1995. They subsequently approved a new convention center in the 
city which would generate $200 million. Thus the opportunity costs within the locales where the 
stadiums are built must be considered in order to generate and accurate image of the economic 
																																																						
5 Wigmore, “With Four Years to Go until World Cup 2022, the Horrors in Qatar Continue – and 
Fifa Just Looks the Other Way.” 
6 Hunter, “Economic Impact Studies: Innaccurate, Misleading, and Unneccessary.” 
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impact of the stadiums.7 When considering the net data, as opposed to just the gross impact of 
the World Cup, the true impact of hosting the World Cup can be seen.  For South Africa, we 
have seen this in terms of trade-offs, as there were strategic decisions based on locations for the 
stadiums, and also on the infrastructure projects.  
 While discussing impact, the majority of scholarship focuses on the quantifiable 
economic effects, which is valid and I will examine directly throughout this thesis. However, 
there are non-quantifiable political impacts that are also extremely important to consider.  When 
considering the economic effects of hosting as a whole, we must consider not only the direct 
economic events, such as the increase of jobs during construction and the inflow of tourists 
during the actual games, but the effects from sponsorships and what has been dubbed the 
“showcase effect,” which puts the nation within the global spotlight and allows for messaging 
and positive effects to reach the nation without these tourists directly coming to the nation for the 
sporting events.8 This effect is unable to be directly observed, as we can see television data but 
cannot truly know the impact of “showcasing” the nation. Sports in the late 20th and 21st 
centuries have changed in terms of viewership, from the event being consumed by watching in 
person, to now being primarily a spectator sport on television and now social media. Thus the 
effects outlined in Hiller in 1989 can be interpreted and taken into account, but the findings have 
to be modernized with the tremendous growth of television expansion and social media impacts 
for the 2010 and 2014 World Cups. The modern “showcase event” may be even greater than 
reported in 1989, with the increased speed of communication and spread of information between 
individuals all across the globe. The advent of not only the internet, but social media, have 
																																																						
7 Crompton, “Economic Impact Analysis of Sports Facilities and Events.” 
8 Hiller, “Impact and Image: The Convergence of Urban Factors in Preparing for the 1988 
Calgary Winter Olympics.” 
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contributed to a more open world, which can increase the “showcase event” that benefits a nation 
after hosting an event of this magnitude. For South Africa specifically, the showcase effect may 
be even greater, as theorists believe that the ten stadiums built for the World Cup were meant to 
“challenge pervasive negative vies and stereotypes about Africa as backward, unchanging, 
‘tribal’, and hopeless continent” and to show that there is “no contradiction between being 
African and being world class.9” The showcase event is another manner of soft power relations 
between nations, as the cultural recognition of hosting a successful World Cup has legitimacy. 
This mantra of elevating South Africa is echoed not only by the scholars, but by major political 
players in South Africa as seen in earlier sections.  
 In terms of sports and politics, Richard Lapchick—a leading anti-apartheid activist and 
current President of the National Consortium for Academics and Sports (NCAS)—has written 
numerous papers on the intersection of sports and politics. He stated in the New York Times 
when reflecting on President Nelson Mandela’s death in 2013 that, “You can smuggle in trade, 
oil, and currency, but if you had a sporting event, you couldn’t play it in the dark… He (Nelson 
Mandela) definitely believed that sports and politics are entwined.10” Lapchick sees sports as a 
way to shed light on social issues, such as how HIV was considered a disease of the “other” until 
Hall of Fame Lakers point guard Magic Johnson was diagnosed and suddenly drew national 
attention.11 When discussing the role of sports and South Africa, he discussed watching a soccer 
game with Mandela after his inauguration, where the newly inaugurated president went straight 
to a South African national soccer game.  Mandela spoke about the sports boycott, which 
																																																						
9 Alegi, “'A Nation To Be Reckoned With’: The Politics of World Cup Stadium Construction in 
Cape Town and Durban, South Africa.” 
10 Longman, “Resistance, and Unity, in Sports.” 
11 TEDx Talks, TEDxDU-Richard Lapchick-5/13/2010. 
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Mandela stated was one of the key reasons that he was elected and that apartheid fell. Thus, we 
can see the ability of sports to create social change within a nation.  
 The literature focuses not only the immediate impacts, which can provide a boost to the 
nation when the bids are announced and during the games themselves, but also have begun to 
focus on the longer term effects. The World Cups, which are decided by FIFA’s executive 
committee through bids from governments, generally promise to elevate the poorest citizens of a 
nation, as the increased attention will lead to growth opportunities, especially with the 
opportunity to work in construction for the stadiums and other infrastructure. However, both in 
South Africa and Brazil, there was massive displacement, as the stadium construction forced 
relocation of many individuals.  In South Africa, the workers began to protest in 2009, due to 
unfair labor conditions and wages. The government proceeded to criticize the workers and state 
that their actions were “unpatriotic,” as if there was a duty to build these stadiums, despite 
President Motlanthe stating that the legacy of the World Cup would be to “showcase South 
African and African hospitality and humanity.12” Thus these political impacts have a great deal 
of influence on the nation’s before the games, and the lack of development of these sites after the 
conclusion of the event has led to long term issues in funding the continuing maintenance of 
stadiums. This will be discussed in Sections IV and V on current and future usage of the ten 
South African stadiums.   
 In addition to politics at the individual and regional level, there have been macro analyses 
of the nation as a whole. Political stability, as previously defined, has been analyzed with 
different definitions and guidelines, especially in terms of the World Cup. Scarlet Cornellison, a 
professor at Stellenbosch University in Cape Town, has argued that mega sporting events give 
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geopolitical legitimacy to the hosts and focuses on the impact of hosting on the BRICS nations. 
South Africa and Brazil have two of the largest, if not the largest economies on their continents 
and have attempted to use the recognition by FIFA as a host nation to position themselves as a 
regional power. The recognition gained from the international governing body of the world’s 
largest sport does give them geopolitical legitimacy, especially against competing regional 
powers.13		As the sole African host, with Morocco losing five bids for the World Cup (1994, 
1998, 2006, 2010, 2026) and no African host considered for an Olympic games, South Africa 
does have a clear sign of international legitimacy as the only seemingly “trusted” African nation 
to host a mega sporting event. This focus on becoming the regional power in the continent was a 
primary focus of the nation, as they marketed the World Cup as the “African World Cup,” which 
firmly signaled their role as a leader not only in Africa, but in the world.  In terms of domestic 
social cohesion and self-pride, scholars point to the 2010 World Cup as not only an opportunity 
for the World Cup to change the international perspective of South Africa, but for a domestic 
paradigm shift. A successful World Cup could change “how South Africans perceive themselves 
and each other.14”  If South Africa can succeed in these non-quantifiable factors, by increasing 
their domestic stability and also their soft power, geopolitical legitimacy, then some of the goals 
of the World Cup would be accomplished.  
In order to present clarity within this thesis, some critical terms must be defined. These 
terms will be featured throughout the thesis and thus the importance cannot be understated. I will 
define “mega building” and “mega construction” as any form of large scale building project that 
has a significant economic impact on the nation or region. These projects are not exclusively 
																																																						
13 Cornelissen, “The Geopolitics of Global Aspiration.” 
14 Alegi and Bolsmann, “South Africa and the Global Game.”	
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stadiums, but include other projects that have been built or are in the process of being 
constructed such as dams, bridges, railway systems, and airports. These mega construction 
projects have been growing in the developing world, as the resources are available for 
construction and these projects can return significant economic gains for these nations. However, 
this case study will focus on stadiums.  
 Mega sporting events will be described as being large-scale cultural events, with impacts 
not only on the host nation domestically, but on a global scale. These events are predictable, as 
the World Cup and Olympics are run on a nearly fully fixed schedule, but the location proves to 
be the variable factor, as the venues change every event. These events have a cultural and 
economic impact within the country, as World Cup hosts experience a major growth in tourism 
during the games, but also on the global scale, as tens of millions of people tune into the games 
on their televisions, bringing the country into the global spotlight during that summer.15 Thus, 
via mega sporting events, the host nation is able to use messaging to reach these millions of 
individuals in a way that should politically and economically benefit the nation.  
 For the conversion rate, to aptly compare between Brazil and South Africa, I will be 
converting both into the United States dollar when applicable. For the date, I will use the date 
that is reflected in the 2010 World Cup Report from South Africa, which the media uses as their 
basis. Thus the date of conversion for both projects will be November 23, 2012. This allows the 
dollar to be used as a fair comparison to both and highlight the differences in cost between the 
currencies and markets. The rate used 8.8695 rand per United States Dollar for South Africa and 
2.089 Brazilian real per United States Dollar.  
																																																						
15 Horne, “The Four ‘Knowns’ of Sports Mega-Events.” 
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 In addition, the term “developing nations” will be defined strictly for this. These would 
be countries with colonial backgrounds who have begun to make significant economic progress 
in the past few decades, with this thesis focusing on a case study on South Africa, with 
supplemental data from Brazil. Mega construction has been growing in developing nations, from 
Africa and Latin America to East Asia and the Middle East. Although the focus on this is with 
stadium building, these results should be able to explain similar economic and political impacts 
in other developing nations who pursue mega building projects.  
 Political impact, which combined with the economic impacts comprise the two dependent 
variables in this thesis, will be comprised of two major factors. The first is political stability and 
will be defined according to the World Bank’s Worldwide Governance Indicators. In this, the 
social unrest, government stability, internal and external conflict, political and terror related 
attacks, and social conflicts are all factored into the model, giving a value between -2.5 
(extremely unstable) to 2.5 (extremely stable) with zero being neither stable nor unstable.16 The 
second will be in regards to the election data in South Africa.  South Africa has held elections 
every five years for the National Assembly, and as a parliamentary system, the seat changes can 
be easily identified per election. I will use three elections: one prior to the bid, one after the bid 
and before the World Cup, and one after, which would be 2004, 2009, and 2014 in South Africa.  
These two markers, the political stability index and the net change in seats in their respective 
legislative bodies, will be used to define the political impact on the nation. I will attempt to 
explain the mitigating factors, as the World Cup is not the sole reason that candidates are elected 
to office, but the political impact of hosting a World Cup may affect the incumbent party, in 
either a positive or negative manner.  
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In this thesis, I examine the construction data—with the predicted cost per stadium at 
multiple points in the process, the actual cost of construction, and the regional economic changes 
in the period of time, including job creation, GDP changes, and other factors.  All of these actual 
numbers will be compared to the predicted numbers that were submitted in the bids for the 
World Cup in the original bid. In terms of regional data, I use the GDP per province and have 
mapped the changed in the GDP from before the bid process to the tournament and subsequent 
years after.    
Outside of the data, I plan on looking at local media publications, starting with media as 
the bids were announced and continuing after the World Cup was held, with any comments made 
up to the present. I look at English speaking papers both domestically and internationally, which 
comment on the positive and negative effects of hosting the games and can allow for insight that 
show more than just the numbers given by the data.  These would allow the data points to be 
more materialized, as this gives a voice to the numbers by the citizens of the nation where they 
are held and the international media.  
 In terms of methodology, I will be running a data analysis at a national and regional level. 
In this, I will examine the changes in both the economic and political stability before the bids 
were announced, the confirmation of the bids and of the sites chosen, to the actual games and 
afterwards. One of the major areas I want to examine is the post-World Cup usage, as many of 
these stadiums were developed solely for the World Cup, but were promised to be used for other 
events. These stadiums involved billions of dollars of investment, yet some are currently 
underutilized. Altogether, these factors will be compared to the projected economic returns and 
the spending. In total, this data combined with the media reactions will be shown to either have 
an effect or no effect on the political and economic state of one or both nations. Preliminarily I 
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expect that my initial hypothesis that mega construction in developing nations, with regards to 
mega sporting events, has a negative effect on the political and economic climate. I would expect 
that there is a relationship between the decline in votes for the incumbent party and the stadium 
costs.  This process has been studied by contemporary scholars, as not only does the spending 
related to the World Cup affect the economic and political stability of a sovereign nation, but 
other large scale building projects as well, such as dams, airports, and other mega building 
projects.  
 In terms of data points, I have collected data from South Africa on several aspects of the 
data. I have found regional GDP numbers per province or region, which allows the data to be 
concentrated to exclusively the areas that built stadiums and had the majority of the projected 
and actual revenue. In this data set, I will additionally be exploring the differences in the 
projected and actual construction costs of the stadiums, and comparing major media reactions to 
the differences in the cost in both nations incurred during the construction phases.  
 The data for the final stadium costs came from the official 2010 South Africa report on 
the World Cup. This data is directly from the South African government, which was published in 
a full report two and a half years after the conclusion of the tournament. The estimates in 2003 
(before the bidding process was completed) and 2006 came from the 2003 Bid Book—which 
included over 500 million rand for other potential stadiums—and a 2007 national treasury report. 
These three points are analyzed in further sections to show the changes over time with the costs 
of the stadiums.  
 Overall, the literature points towards the direction that there is a relationship between 
hosting a mega sporting event and an impact on the political and economic stability of the host 
nations. The construction costs, the tourism impact, and the subsequent political and economic 
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impacts will be examined in throughout the thesis, with the media’s impact being discussed in 
Section VI.  With these targets and data sets, we should be able to see if a relationship—whether 
positive or negative—exists between both political stability and the hosting of an event and the 
economic impacts of hosting.  
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 SECTION II: WORLD CUP BIDDING PROCESS:  
 The World Cup is awarded to a host nation every four years, during the same year as the 
Winter Olympic games. The bidding process and bids occur generally between seven and ten 
years before the actual games begin, allowing nations to develop the massive building projects 
necessary to host it. The Fédération Internationale de Football Association (FIFA) presides over 
the sport at its highest level, managing the soccer at the World Cup and Olympic levels. The 
bidding process has historically had a regional rotation, as the World Cup rotated between 
regions every cycle. Until 2002, the process rotated between Europe and the Americas, with 
games alternating between the regions every cycle to avoid regional bias between the two largest 
soccer playing continents. However, with the 2002 World Cup hosted jointly by South Korea and 
Japan, this precedent was broken and other regions became suitable hosts.  FIFA then decided to 
begin rotating between major regions, now including Asia, Africa, and the Middle East to 
promote the game globally. Africa was chosen as the host continent in 2010, South America for 
2014, and other regions, such as Australia and Qatar have submitted bids for consideration.  
Thus, the committee now rotates between more areas of football for hosts and these regions only 
can host the games. This process ended with the 2014 World Cup, as in 2007 FIFA has decided 
that the rotational program was flawed—as only one host formally applied for the 2014 bid and 
thus was automatically given the bid—while the new format allows all nations to apply for bids, 
regardless of region.17 Regions who have not hosted a World Cup, if they meet the qualifications, 
are now being legitimately considered—with Russia and Qatar hosting their first World Cups in 
2018 and 2022, respectively. The chosen host nation does not only become the venue for the 
marquee event of the World Cup, but hosts the Confederation Cup a year prior to the main event, 
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which include the host national team, the prior World Cup champion, and six winners from the 
six major regional soccer groups.  These six regions also comprise the majority of the teams 
participating in the World Cup and represent all six populated continents. The Confederations 
Cup is usually seen as a dress rehearsal by FIFA to make sure that the facilities, infrastructure, 
and other parts of the host nation are up to par with the requirements.   
 The March 15, 2001 meeting of the FIFA Executive Committee decided that the new 
rotation would begin in Africa. They allowed countries to declare interest for hosting until 
December 31, 2002 and formal bids submitted by August 31, 2003.  The FIFA Executive 
Committee planned to decide the host in April 2004.18 Subsequently, the next region chosen was 
South America, who was part of the traditional rotation process between Europe and the 
Americas, but had only hosted three World Cups from 1930 to 2010—with first World Cup in 
Uruguay in 1930, Brazil in 1950, and Argentina in 1978. Thus, it had been nearly four decades 
since the World Cup has returned to South America. The rotation planned to include North 
America, Oceania, Asia, and Europe, but was never fulfilled due to complications with finding 
hosts in South America during the 2014 bidding process and subsequent FIFA corruption 
scandals.  
 As of the present, the rules allow for any nation to bid for the World Cup, regardless of 
geographic region. Regional diversity has organically occurred, as the previous five World Cups 
were held in four distinct regions, with Qatar in the Middle East hosting in 2022 and the United 
States, Canada, and Mexico hosting a combined 2026 World Cup in North America. With these 
bids, six different regions have been or will be represented in the 21st Century, which is the most 
diverse set of regions that the games have seen. The 2030 World Cup has initial bidding in 
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multiple regions, as it is the centennial of the games and many interesting joint bids, such as the 
“Balkan Four” of Greece, Bulgaria, Serbia, and Romania, and a unified East Asia bid in the 
works with China, Japan, South Korea, and North Korea. Thus, the issues that faced these two 
specific World Cups can be studied in some form of isolation, as they were the only two bound 
by these geographic constraints, however the process of construction and the subsequent effects 
on their respective economies and political stability can be examined and used in consideration 
for other nations planning on hosting a mega sporting event. The political nature of the bid 
process, as the executive voting committee of FIFA models an international governing 
organization, shows the need for geopolitical legitimacy in order to gain a World Cup bid.  
2010 WORLD CUP BIDDING PROCESS:  
For the 2010 World Cup, five nations submitted bids: Morocco, Egypt, South Africa, and 
a combined bid from Libya and Tunisia. The Executive Committee banned co-hosted games 
from this tournament, meaning Libya or Tunisia would have to host the Cup.  Tunisia withdrew 
their bid, and Libya was unable to meet the requirements for hosting the games, and thus were 
disqualified. The final three candidates were voted on and announced May 15, 2004, with South 
Africa winning the vote 14-10 over Morocco, as Egypt received zero votes. Morocco has 
continued to bid for World Cups, bidding (and once again losing out) for the 2026 World Cup.  
With the 2026 World Cup being awarded to a three-country bid of the United States, Canada, 
and Mexico, Morocco has lost out on its fifth World Cup bid.  
 South Africa had previously lost the bid for the 2006 World Cup to Germany in a 
controversial manner, with the delegate from New Zealand abstaining from voting for South 
Africa as directed by the Oceania delegation, due to “pressure from European nations,” including 
	 Avdellas 19 
alleged death threats and potential bribery.19 Thus without the New Zealand’s vote, the World 
Cup was awarded to Germany by a 12-11 vote on the third ballot. Afterwards, FIFA President 
Joseph “Sepp” Blatter stated that his tiebreaking vote would have awarded South Africa the 
games.  
Allegations of corruption did occur from the bidding process, and it was later uncovered 
that $10 million in bribes were paid to the FIFA Executive Committee for South Africa to host 
the World Cup and that Morocco had actually won the rights to host the games.20 Despite the 
fraudulent behavior of FIFA and the South African government, this behavior does not affect the 
public sentiment at the time nor the construction costs for the World Cup. These allegations were 
not uncovered until well after the 2010 World Cup had taken place, and thus were not a factor in 
the mega-building projects needed for hosting the games. However, we can examine this data 
with the more recent trends and see if the revelation has affected the post-2015 opinion on the 
2010 World Cup.  
First and foremost, the initial reaction from South Africa was pure elation, as it was not 
only the highest achievement of South African football—as they became the first African nation 
to host the World Cup—but an achievement for the nation to show that in less than two decades, 
South Africa went from a de jure segregated nation to hosting one of the largest sporting events 
in the globe. As the bid was announced, the nation showed citizens celebrating, while former 
President Nelson Mandela wept for joy in Zurich and stated that he felt “like a young man of 
15,” as he was presented a replica of the FIFA World Cup Trophy by the governing body of the 
sport, while recounting how the World Cup and FIFA had supported black South Africans during 
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Apartheid. The nation saw this as not only an opportunity to prove that they were a legitimate 
competitor in sports, but as a legitimate world power as well.  Incumbent President Thabo Mbeki 
declared that “Africa’s time has come,” on national television, as he saw this event as a 
geopolitical statement. He elaborated on this by stating, “We want to ensure that, one day, 
historians will reflect upon the 2010 World Cup as a moment when Africa stood tall and 
resolutely turned the tide on centuries of poverty and conflict21” More than this, as the first 
African nation to host the World Cup, they were able to brand the event as not only their own 
World Cup, but an “African World Cup” for all members of the continent.  
For the 2010 World Cup, South Africa initially planned for eleven cities in ten provinces 
to hold thirteen stadiums, but narrowed it down to ten stadiums in eight provinces, with three in 
Gauteng, which is the most populous and wealthiest province. In the original plan, the nation 
planned to renovate five stadiums and build five new stadiums, with three new stadiums in the 
process of construction. The final ten stadiums included three stadiums that were not in the initial 
bid report, with Nelson Mandela Bay, Moses Mabhida Stadium, and Cape Town Stadium all 
being chosen to be built new instead of renovating the three existing stadiums in their respective 
cities.22  However, Peter Mokaba Stadium needed extensive renovations and it was more 
efficient to build a new stadium than renovate the old.  The initial plans, via the 2003 World Cup 
Bid Book, indicated that the nation would spend 1.061 billion Rand on the ten stadiums (with an 
additional 513,750,000 to the three stadiums that were proposed, but removed from the plans 
later on).  
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In terms of the political significance of the bid process, we must look directly to the 
source of the process: the bid committee and subsequently World Cup Organizer. South Africa’s 
bid was led by Danny Jordaan, the head of the South African Football Association (SAFA). 
However, before this, Jordaan was a member of the South African parliament, former mayor of 
Nelson Mandela Bay—the site of one of the newly constructed stadiums—and is still a member 
of the African National Congress, which has been the incumbent party in South Africa since the 
end of Apartheid in 1994. The bid process, while technically controlled by SAFA, has been 
directly supported by the government.  SAFA does not have the ability to construct stadiums, 
infrastructure, or any of the necessary building projects for hosting a potential World Cup, so the 
government must be directly involved. Thus, we are unable to separate the South African 
government from the proceedings in the bid process, as without their approval this would not be 
possible.  
 The current  FIFA Bidding Handbook directly states that “The competitions have such a 
national and international significance that the successful hosting and staging of…the 
competitions cannot be effectively achieved without the full cooperation of the Government.23” 
Thus FIFA itself recognizes the political aspect of their competition and directly includes this as 
a factor in their bid evaluation program.  
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SECTION III: CONSTRUCTION IN SOUTH AFRICA: 
 In order for South Africa to be able to host the 2010 World Cup, the nation had to prepare 
for a massive influx of tourists at one time, while building or renovating ten stadiums. Five of the 
ten new stadiums needed to be completely built, while First National Bank Stadium24 had 
extensive renovations to become the largest stadium on the continent of Africa at a capacity of 
just under 95,000 spectators.  Along with the ten stadiums, South Africa had to focus on 
infrastructure, spending nearly $1.3 billion on the roads, airports, and other projects for the four-
week sporting event.  
 For a nationwide building project over the course of five to six years, there are numerous 
issues that were unforeseen, which altered the construction costs and timeline. As a time 
sensitive project, there was a need to finish all stadiums before the 2009 Confederations Cup, 
which is seen as a dry run and a test for the World Cup. This event hosts the eight regional 
winners and the host team who will be competing in the tournament the following year, but does 
not draw the worldwide fanfare nor the full thirty-two team field that the World Cup has. Thus 
this is a chance for the host nation to test their facilities in a lower pressure environment, with a 
year to prepare for competition if there are any major complications. The biggest issue in South 
Africa was that Nelson Mandela Bay Stadium was chosen to host the Confederation Cup, but 
was not ready for the March 30, 2009 deadline. Therefore, Port Elizabeth had to withdraw their 
stadium from the Confederations Cup, and press on with construction on the stadium to finish 
before the actual competition. Despite the setbacks that were apparent in 2009, all ten stadiums 
were completed in time for the World Cup.  
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 In terms of workers, over 240,000 workers were employed strictly in construction for the 
stadiums 25. This massive influx of workers did at least contribute to a boost in the overall GDP 
of the regions, as the data shows that there is a reasonable significance between GDP growth, 
stadium cost, and employment from 2004 to 2012. The government, which is the source of the 
employment numbers per stadium, had initially stated that the World Cup would create over 
400,000 new jobs, and this nearly quarter-million employed for stadium development created an 
environment where this economic growth was possible.  
 However, in 2009, South Africa—like many other nations—suffered a large scale 
economic panic. After years of economic growth, including a peak of 7.5% growth in 2005, they 
suffered a crippling recession in 2009.  This panic, just months before the World Cup, 
contributed to large scale effects with construction costs, as the market prices increased on the 
stadiums that were not finished.  This was the only year of the data range observed with negative 
GDP growth (-1.54%) nationwide, as six of nine provinces also had negative growth.   
In studies completed on the construction process, the largest issue that these contractors 
and consultants said led to delays was material cost overruns. In addition to this, poor material 
estimates and an increase in labor costs also affected the speed of construction.26 These factors 
did not condemn the World Cup, as it still continued, but it did affect the prices of the World 
Cup, compared to the initial figures. The value of the rand, according to its nominal effective 
exchange rate27 or NEEP, plummeted in early 2009, thus spiking the costs of construction 
material as the purchasing power of the rand was significantly lower.  
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I have attached a graph below, taken from the South African Reserve Bank, that maps the 
currency’s NEEP from the day that the bid was announced until the kickoff of the first World 
Cup match. Notice the steep drop offs in 2006, 2007, and 2009, as all three of these factors 
contributed to the increased material and labor costs.  
28 
 As the recession was in full force, over one-quarter of the total stadium construction 
workforce began to strike. The strike, consisting of over 70,000 workers, began July 8, 2009, less 
than a year before the opening ceremonies of the World Cup.  The National Union of 
Mineworkers (NUM) represented these workers, as construction falls under their jurisdiction. 
These workers—who were guaranteed weekly payment of 2,500 Rand ($310)—wanted a 13% 
increase in their wages, or they would not continue. This effort legitimately threatened the 
possibility of Africa’s first global sporting event, as there were six stadiums: the six not used for 
the Confederation’s Cup, that needed to finish still in 2009.29  In addition to the stadiums, this 
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strike threated the construction of a high speed rail link between the O. R. Tambo International 
Airport and Johannesburg, which is essential for transporting tourists to FNB Stadium and Ellis 
Park Stadium, as well as being the center of the sporting event. The strike was resolved within a 
week, with workers and managers agreeing to a 12% raise, and allowing the stadium 
construction to be resolved and construction to finish in time for the competition.30 This rapid 
agreement, where management increased their offer from a 10% raise to a 12% raise, was due to 
mounting pressure to accomplish this task, as numerous other labor disputes, especially with 
large scale unions, have dragged out in South Africa in the 21st Century and beyond.  
 However, 2014 reports have stated that five major construction firms in South Africa 
colluded on prices for their services during the World Cup, which cost the government several 
million rand.31  These companies were referred to the Competition Committee and fined a total 
of 1.5 billion rand, while being forced to have community service involvement, including  
mentoring or financially supporting smaller, black-owned construction companies.32 These 
factors, combined with the economic recession, led to an increased cost in producing these 
stadiums.  
This was the only major delay in construction, as overall the sites were well managed 
with only two worker deaths during the entire process: one in August 2008 at Peter Mokaba 
Stadium and one at Cape Town Stadium in January 2009. Outside of these deaths, there were 
very few reported injuries, with FNB Stadium recording over one million accident free hours 
during the building process,33 which is in stark contrast to the eight deaths in stadium 
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construction for the 2014 World Cup34 and seventeen for the 2018 World Cup in Russia.35  
Overall, South Africa had few incidents in terms of construction for the World Cup and thus had 
a fairly successful construction process, with the largest problem being the economic issues that 
were encompassed all industry, not just construction for the mega sporting event.  
 Overall, the World Cup stadiums cost significantly more than was originally expected, 
with overall costs being billions of rand more than even the conservative estimates in 2007. I 
have attached a graph below with the three stages of development and the major differences in 
cost between the three released costs.     
 
 The vast discrepancies for Nelson Mandela Bay, Cape Town Stadium, and Moses 
Mahbida Stadium are due to the original plans for FIFA to renovate three existing stadiums—
Port Elizabeth, Kings Park, and Newlands—instead of building new stadiums. First National 
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Bank Stadium was also projected to also need only minor upgrades as the thirty-year-old stadium 
had the highest capacity of any venue before the renovation. Instead, South Africa decided to 
essentially rebuild FNB Stadium, as only a historic portion of the stadium was preserved, and the 
stadium was hollowed out and rebuilt into the “Calabash” that was the centerpiece for the event. 
South Africa did not release the bid book before the World Cup, and has been extremely limited 
on the publication of the bid book, due to the tremendous increases from the original estimates to 
the final project, as the average stadium cost over 14 times more than was projected in the 2003 
estimates. The data for the increase in prices is shown below.  
 
SECTION IV: THE WORLD CUP 
 During the World Cup, the stadiums were nearly full the entire time, with an average of 
92% of seats full during the 64 matches played. Soccer City—which hosted the World Cup 
Final—had 99.2% of all seats filled in the eight matches hosted. Half of the stadiums had over 
90% of seats full, with the lowest stadium—Free State Stadium—still filling over 80% of its 
seats in the six matches it hosted. The chart below shows the difference in each stadium between 
the capacity and the average amount of fans.  
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South Africa spent on average 31,057 rand per seat, while spending 5,028 rand per fan 
attended. In terms of total attendance, the 2010 World Cup is the fourth most attended World 
Cup with 3.178 million fans attending the games. It only trails the 1994 United States World Cup 
(3.568 million), the 2014 Brazil World Cup (3.441 million) and the 2006 Germany World Cup 
(3.367 million).   
In terms of immediate return on investment, the South African government indicated that 
3.64 billion rand was spent by tourists in 2010, with the average spending by tourists increasing 
from 9,500 rand in to 11,800 rand from 2009 to 2010.36  Despite the fact that this revenue is less 
than the cost of the three stadiums in Gauteng, the increase in tourism revenue which can 
continue with the “showcase” effect, which was discussed in the introduction but brings global 
spotlight to the nation without the tourists directly visiting the nation. South Africa’s report 
discusses this as well, as 49% of the surveyed individuals saw locations in South Africa during 
the World Cup, thus promoting locations in South Africa. The showcase effect can serve as a 
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way for nations to continue their tourism increase after the event is over, as people who see the 
positive aspects of the nation, South Africa in this case, will continue to consider it as a tourist 
location. This long term impact can continue to show a return on investment for South Africa, 
which can increase the political and economic influence that South Africa has on not only the 
region, but on the international community.  
Revised studies in the past decade have found a clear link between tourism and the FIFA 
World Cup, as it is the second largest sporting tourist event. Studies place the average increase in 
tourism at 8% for all major mega sporting events (the Summer and Winter Olympics, the FIFA 
World Cup, the Cricket World Cup, and the Lions Rugby Tour) but there is a major discrepancy 
between the Summer Olympics and FIFA World Cup versus the other events, as these marquee 
events garner significantly more tourism than the others.37  
SECTION V: CURRENT STADIUM USAGE: 
 The World Cup consists of sixty-four matches over a month long period. However, the 
stadiums continue to need maintenance and staffing after the World Cup in order to stay 
functional. The biggest fear of the World Cup stadium building effort is that the stadiums will be 
underused after the month-long period. President Jacob Zuma stated “There are a number of 
plans to make the stadiums profitable after the last whistle,” while going on to say that the nation 
plans on trying to get foreign soccer stars to come play in these venues.38 which is true in some 
cases, but overall most stadiums have been at least breaking even in terms of upkeep costs. 
However, some of the stadiums, especially in the more remote regions, have become the dreaded 
“white elephants” that the state cannot afford to maintain.  
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The largest stadium, FNB Stadium, has been utilized for numerous events, especially 
those outside of the realm of sports. The stadium’s largest game was not a World Cup game, but 
the Carning Black Lapel Cup between two of the nation’s premier soccer teams—the Kaizer 
Chiefs and the Orlando Pirates—with a record of 94,807 fans in attendance. The stadium hosted 
Nelson Mandela’s official memorial service in 2013. FNB Stadium is also a home venue for both 
the national soccer and rugby teams. In addition to sports, FNB Stadium has hosted numerous 
musical acts, including Coldplay, Justin Bieber, Beyoncé, and Jay-Z. Despite the high upkeep 
costs—2.5 million rand per month—the stadium continues to be a centerpiece for events in 
South Africa.39  Since its re-opening in 2009, it has gate receipts for over 8 million people 
entering the stadium and holds approximately 105 events per year.40  As the largest stadium on 
the continent, FNB Stadium continues to be a utilized even after the World Cup, but this seems 
to be the exception, as it is the premier location in the nation for events.  
 Cape Town Stadium has had a reduction in capacity—removing over 13,000 seats to 
accommodate luxury boxes and suites, as was projected before the stadium was built.41 The 
stadium continues to be used for rugby sevens, including the World Rugby Sevens competition, 
along with soccer matches and other events. The city is currently in the process of finding a 
naming sponsor for the stadium, to begin to alleviate the costs on the tax payers.42 However, this 
is a recent development, as the city has been managing the stadium since 2010. The city had 
stated that yearly operating costs—including adjacent parks built for recreation—was 
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approximately 46.5 million rand per year.43 If funding from a naming sponsor is found in the 
next year, this would significantly reduce the burden on tax payers.  AJAX Cape Town left the 
stadium for the 2014 season, due to poor conditions from hosting concerts during the season 
which damaged the field.44 These concerts were necessary to maintain revenue for the stadium. 
The team has since returned to the stadium since the incidents in 2014.  
 Moses Mabhida Stadium has faced significant issues, as it has fallen into disrepair after 
the World Cup. Despite still hosting events, the city has had difficulties maintaining the stadium, 
with the SkyCar—an incline system that takes tourists to the top of the stadium to view the city 
of Durban from above—has been closed since October 2018 and needs a complete overhaul. The 
stadium, per local reports, has panels falling from the ceiling and needs significant repairs for it 
to continue working.45  
 Ellis Park Stadium, the second largest stadium in the country and ninth largest in the 
continent, has continued to be utilized as a rugby stadium, as that was its primary purpose before 
the World Cup. It serves as the home stadium for two major rugby teams, and has a greater 
capacity for rugby (62,597) than it did for the World Cup (55,686. It has sold its naming rights to 
Coca Cola from 2008 to 2012—excluding the World Cup—then Emirates Airlines in 2014, both 
of which have alleviated some of the maintenance costs from the city of Johannesburg, who 
currently owns the stadium.46 Overall, the stadium has hosted numerous major concerts, South 
African teams, as well as European soccer games and is still seeing major usage after the World 
Cup.  
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 Loftus Versfeld Stadium is one of the privately owned stadiums—as it is owned by the 
Blue Bulls Rugby Union. Thus the rugby club has taken care of maintenance for the stadium. In 
terms of World Cup upgrades, it had the second smallest cost of all stadiums with only minor 
upgrades needed in order to accommodate the competition.  
 Mbombela Stadium—the lowest cost new stadium built by 140 million rand—has also 
had issues with upkeep, as it is managed by the Mbombela municipality. The municipality has 
allocated 11.6 million rand for upkeep47, and had the Mpumalanga Black Aces use the stadium 
as their home until the club dissolved in 2016. Currently the only stable tenant—outside of the 
occasional national team game—is the rugby club, Pumas. Of all ten stadiums, Mbombela 
Stadium has had the lowest utilization rate, as in 2014 the average attendance rate was 9.8%. The 
stadium also has hosted the fewest amount of events of any of the World Cup stadiums.48 
Overall, these factors could explain the decline in votes for the ANC since 2009 from 
Mpumalanga.   
 Nelson Mandela Bay Stadium has consistently hosted local teams—as the home to both 
soccer and rugby clubs—along with national team games and multiple legs of the Rugby World 
Series. The municipality stated that the stadium would become profitable by 2013, and that they 
have found ways to keep the stadium in good condition while reducing costs.49  
 The regional government in Polokwane, the home of Peter Mokaba Stadium, has seen the 
additional growth in tourism and nightlife, but has not been able to break even with stadium 
costs. The city, who owns the stadium, has been funding 17 million of the 23-million rand 
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upkeep of the stadium, needing at least two matches of 15,000 fans per month to remain 
solvent.50 This seems lofty, as the population of the city is just over 500,000 million inhabitants, 
but possible. Peter Mokaba Stadium, as will be discussed later, has been the most frequently 
criticized project from the 2010 World Cup by the press.  
 Royal Bafokeng Stadium has lost its sole tenant, as the Platinum Stars Football Club 
dissolved in 2018, to move to Cape Town as a new franchise. Initially, the Royal Bafokeng 
Nation sold the team with the intent of keeping it in the region, just under new ownership.51 
However, new ownership decided to move to Cape Town. Now, there are no major professional 
soccer teams in the North West Province, but the occasional African premier soccer team uses 
the stadium for matches. This stadium, along with Peter Mokaba, have been the two most 
criticized as they are the farthest away from population centers and do not have set teams as of 
2019 that have regular matches in the stadium. However, as a privately owned stadium from the 
Royal Bafokeng nation, there is not a major impact on the tax payers of Rustenberg.  
 Free State Stadium currently has three primary tenants: two rugby teams and one soccer 
team. The stadium also has a naming deal in place with the automobile company Toyota, which 
offsets some of the maintenance costs. Overall, Free State Stadium has been fairly well used 
since the 2010 World Cup.  
 South Africa as a whole held the 2013 Africa Cup of Nations, which is biennial soccer 
tournament between the top sixteen teams in Africa. The tournament was originally slated to be 
held in Libya, but due to the Libyan Civil War in 2011, the committee asked South Africa to 
trade bids, as South Africa was hosting the 2017 Africa Cup of Nations. South Africa was able to 
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use five stadiums: FNB Stadium, Mose Mabhida Stadium, Nelson Mandela Bay Stadium, 
Mbombela Stadium, and Royal Bafokeng Stadium. These matches had significantly less 
attendance than the World Cup, but did give an opportunity for the stadiums to be used again in a 
major competition after the World Cup. The total attendance and revenue was much lower, but 
the ability to host a fairly successful major event with less than sixteen months’ notice was an 
accomplishment for South Africa and led to further utilization of mainly empty stadiums during 
that time of year.  
 South Africa is also exploring hosting the 2023 Women’s World Cup, as they have begun 
the bid process.  The South African Football Association (SAFA) sent a letter to FIFA December 
8, 2018 and is waiting for a response from FIFA before sending an official bid.52 SAFA 
President Danny Jordaan has used the 2010 World Cup as part of the bid for the 2023 Women’s 
World Cup, and is likely to utilize many of the same venues that were used in 2010, as the 
Women’s edition has a smaller field of teams. That being said, this future utilization is not 
guaranteed, as several other qualified nations are also bidding for the event, including Australia, 
Colombia, Japan, New Zealand, and Thailand. The nation must complete the formal bid process 
by March 15, 2019. As of March 27, 2019, South Africa has confirmed their bid for the 2023 
FIFA Women’s World Cup. The bid book will be submitted by October 2019 and the host 
selection will be in March 2020. The host of the tournament will be chosen March 2020, giving 
the host nation only three years to prepare, which indicates that only hosts with established 
infrastructure and stadiums would be chosen, as new construction is impossible in that time 
frame.  If South Africa is chosen, it would be the first African nation to host a Women’s World 
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Cup, and just the the fifth nation to host both the men’s and women’s competition, along with the 
United States, Sweden, Germany, and France. This event, which is smaller, would still bring new 
life to some of the stadiums, and would once again put South Africa in the international 
spotlight.  
 Overall, the stadiums have been utilized by local teams, despite the impacts of lower 
crowds since the World Cup. When focusing on stadiums only, most of the stadiums are 
sustainable in terms of operating costs. In total, five of the ten stadiums are either privately 
owned or have primary naming sponsors. However, the challenges of constructing large scale 
stadiums still leave a long term effect on the individual cities, leaving them responsible to fill 
stadiums without the allure of the World Cup.   
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SECTION VI: MEDIA IMPACT 
 In terms of the newspaper impact, I have looked at The Sowetan, which is the largest 
English language newspaper in South Africa with a readership of over two million. They were 
extremely positive in the initial phases, but have voiced mixed opinions of the World Cup both 
during the World Cup period (May-August 2010 with the competition occurring from June 11-
July 11) and after the World Cup (July 12, 2010-Present).  In addition, I have examined 
international reports from the corresponding period, using the New York Times and The 
Guardian, which are two of the largest papers internationally. These pieces show a reflection of 
the mainstream views of the more liberal ends of the developing world, which as shown below 
are both more skeptical of the bid and reserved in their tone. These pieces from the “western 
media” have the underlying assumptions about South Africa, as was discussed in the earlier 
sections, but see the progress of hosting the World Cup for South African political legitimacy.     
 After the bids were announced, the Sowetan stated that winning the 2010 bid would be 
“endorsing the South African miracle created in 1994,” as this was a public and international 
way of showing that South Africa was a legitimate nation in the global scheme.53 After the vote 
was confirmed and South Africa was named the winner, the Sowetan published an editorial that 
declared that this was a “vote of confidence in the ability of South Africans in particular, and 
Africans in general,” as the World Cup showed that in just over a decade, the nation went from 
an apartheid regime to being chosen to host one of the largest international sporting events.54 
Overall, the initial feedback from the World Cup was positive. Note that not many economic 
details were omitted from these articles, as they focused on political legitimacy and a potential 
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leadership role that was granted vis-à-vis the World Cup to South Africa. Despite the lack of 
quantitative details, these show that the initial wave of support for the World Cup was a net 
positive.   
 Internationally, the New York Times stated that the 2004 announcement that South 
Africa would host “puts the ‘World’ back into the World Cup,” as after this World Cup, five of 
the six populated continents have hosted the event.55 The “global pariah,” due to its past history 
of apartheid, was elevated seemingly equal to the other nations in the world of sports. In relating 
these articles from major global publications, we can see that although the historical chains of 
apartheid will continue to fetter South Africa, that there is progress and a newfound respect that 
international media outlets now posses for the nation due to their legitimacy.  
 In early 2010, The Guardian put out an editorial by David Runciman, a professor of 
politics at the University of Cambridge, which highlights the issues with the World Cup. 
Runciman does not doubt that it would be a success for South Africa to host a World Cup and 
that it is in FIFA’s best interest to help South Africa achieve that goal. However, his take is that 
Europe, via FIFA, will continue to corrupt the process and take from developing nations, by 
taking their talent to play for clubs in Europe. He outlines that the “great hope behind holding big 
sporting events in developing countries is that the glare of international publicity will drive the 
process of reform,” but that it has not worked in the past, citing the 2004 Athens Olympics.  He 
then criticizes the funds, stating that these megaliths of stadiums were built while a third of 
citizens live on less than $2 per day.56 Overall, Runciman believes that Africa can gain some 
legitimacy from this, but that it is not worth the cost.  
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 During the midst of the competition, the Sowetan published an article discussing the role 
of the stadiums as white elephants, which was previously highlighted in the earlier section. This 
fear of these stadiums turning into monoliths is very real, as the many of the stadiums did not 
have sponsorships or major tenants at the time of construction. The editor of The Sowetan 
directly stated that “I don’t know how there going to be maintained… You need a mathematician 
to figure out how they are going to move forward and pay for them after the World Cup.”57 This 
article did not focus on the larger stadiums, such as FNB Stadium, which will be utilized as the 
premier stadium not only in South Africa, but in the entire continent, but especially Peter 
Mokaba stadium in Polokwane. This rural city has a population of around 500,000 and was 
constructed for only four World Cup games. Other stadiums who have lost their primary tenants 
were also at risk at this time, per the article. However, later that year, the Sowetan declared that 
“There is no way Peter Mokaba Stadium will become a white elephant,” as they had brought 
some premier clubs to play in the stadiums after the World Cup.58 The 2010 article has been 
dispelled and some of the fears have come true, as the stadium has current financial issues, 
however, the immediate thoughts were that the stadium would at least break even.  
 However, one article during the World Cup was extremely negative about the World 
Cup. This article, titled “Soccer has been turned into a shackle to enslave us,” highlights the 
negative effects of the event and calls FIFA out for profiting off of the nation. Mngxitama 
focuses on the cost trade off, as the government has allowed tax breaks for FIFA, while claiming 
that budgetary constraints negatively affected the poor by cutting healthcare and other necessary 
programs. Overall, this article focuses on the negative tradeoffs—which are extremely 
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justifiable—as the World Cup was a tremendous investment for stadiums and infrastructure.59 As 
seen in the South African budget report and in scholarly articles, there were a significant amount 
of tax breaks given to corporations and FIFA as a whole for the World Cup. This promotes 
industry and investment, but does have negative consequences on the host nation.  
 In looking at a local level, several articles have been written about the impact on locals, 
but none have been more poignant than ones about the workers who have benefitted from the 
additional tourism. Local vendors, such as Austin Chikovo, who was the centerpiece of a 2010 
piece before the World Cup, have used the increase in tourism to benefit their families Chikovo, 
a father of three, said that the increase in World Cup tourism on his flag vending business 
allowed him to send his three daughters to school, pay for their uniforms and rent.60  Despite this 
being just one core case of an improvement, we have to see this feature in the most prominent 
English speaking newspaper as some sign of success from the less fortunate in South Africa.   
 During late June, the Sowetan reported the tourism data for the first half of the month. 
They reported that 682,507 tourists entered the country per the Department of Home Affairs 
during the first week of competition. Overall, the Minister of Home Affairs reported that 1.7 
million people arrived into the nation, which was an increase of over one million from the same 
period last year.  Spending was also reported at 974 million rand for this period, with the United 
States, United Kingdom, Australia, France, and Brazil contributing over half of the spending.61 
This initial spending contributes to the 3.64 billion rand that was named in the 2010 South 
African Report.  
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 Reports after the World Cup cited the World Cup as a model for other African nations, 
stating that “The year 2010 was a game changer and risk mitigator to which countries and cities 
of Africa will point to for affirmation that it (the World Cup) can be done and they have what it 
takes.” The Soweto praised the World Cup in this article as a model for the future and how a 
mega sporting event should be run, while pointing to the World Cup as a model for the future of 
South Africa.62 The sentiment in December 2010 was still very positive from the event. It later 
concluded that it was the “best FIFA World Cup ever,” as not only was the competition exciting, 
with Spain defeating the Netherlands for the trophy, but that “we (South Africa) have never seen 
anything like this in the history of this country – pre-colonial, during apartheid and post-
liberation.”63 The author of this page, which was written the day of the World Cup Final, stated 
that the impact on South Africa, not only with tourists, but local population as well, has led to a 
successful World Cup for the nation.  
The New York Times pondered the long term effects immediately after the World Cup, 
by stating that the tangible benefits are uncertain, but depend on the actions taken by SAFA. If 
South Africa can continue to grow its brand and national team, it can continue to elevate the 
usage of these stadiums.64 President Zuma discussed the future of South African soccer, despite 
the losses in the World Cup Group Stage.  He told the team that, the government would use 
funds that FIFA gave for development to promote the youth program, touting it as an educational 
opportunity for the the less fortunate in the country to take part in the game. SAFA, per the 
article, was attempting to transform the mentality of the nation and was using the World Cup to 
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do so, as soccer is now an identity for the nation.65 If this growth can happen, then this could lead 
to an increased usage of the stadiums.  
The Guardian reported the initial skepticism going into the World Cup, by starting its 
first article by discussing all of the potential failures from venues being incomplete to a “machete 
race war” in the streets. These initial thoughts, while they certainly were exaggerated, were 
common by the western media. However, the article dispels this notion and compliments the 
nation in various areas, from the stadiums and infrastructure to the security. The major focus was 
on the atmosphere and the legacy from the event. The article concluded by stating, “But the most 
persuasive argument deployed by Jordaan and the government was that successfully delivering 
the World Cup would help change perceptions of the country and the continent. That they have 
surely done.66” This sentence shows the geopolitical impact of the World Cup on the 
international importance of hosting these events, as the legitimacy gained goes further than the 
sixty-four matches played. This legitimacy gained serves as a manner of increasing soft power, 
as a successful mega sporting event lends credence to the idea that if a nation can accomplish 
massive infrastructure and construction goals, while providing a fairly secure and safe 
environment, it can be a responsible and impactful member of the international community.  
 Former President F.W. de Klerk published an article in the Sowetan discussing the World 
Cup. He stated that the “Cinderella continent” of Africa had been gifted the World Cup despite 
the “ugly First World stepsisters” actions in previous bidding. He continued to discuss the 
skeptical mindset that others had, believing that the stadiums and infrastructure would not be 
prepared. However, he echoed the successes of the World Cup, stating that this event “changed 
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the international perceptions of our country.” This statement is much more about international 
geopolitics than soccer, as the perceptions of inability to succeed—per de Klerk—were not 
solely about stadium and infrastructure, but apply to the country more generally.67 De Klerk’s 
message in the Sowetan show at least the perceived geopolitical impact of hosting a successful 
World Cup by former South African leaders.  
 One year following the 2010 World Cup, the New York Times wrote to discuss the 
effects of the World Cup on the first year. The article relied on survey data that said 70% of 
South Africans believe that the World Cup brought economic disadvantages to the nation, but 
also 78% responded that it brought “social cohesion” to the country. Despite the stadiums being 
seen as monoliths by the author, she also discusses the social impact, as she senses a sense of 
national pride from the event.68 The Guardian also discusses the social cohesion aspect, while 
dubbing the World Cup a success. It discusses the differences between the 1995 Rugby World 
Cup—the first major event after apartheid ended—and the 2010 World Cup. Richard Williams 
looks at a small detail—the national anthem—and uses this to highlight social change. Rugby 
was seen as an Afrikaner sport played by predominantly white nations such as New Zealand, 
South Africa, Australia, and the United Kingdom, while soccer is more global. He states, “At the 
early games (of the 1995 Rugby World Cup) featuring the home team in that tournament it was 
noticeable that Nkosi Sikelel iAfrika (the newly created South African national anthem) was 
heard in virtual silence by the almost entirely white crowd while Die Stem (the Afrikaner anthem 
that was co-national anthems with Nkosi Sikelel iAfrika from 1994-1997) was belted out with 
something close to defiance.” 15 years later, the tone had changed with pride in the national 
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team, which is mostly black, and the unified national anthem being echoed by all citizens. This 
minor point shows the social cohesion, but also works towards the points discussed by leaders in 
the nation like Mandela and de Klerk to put the tarnished past behind and move South Africa 
away from its past and into a legitimate international power.   
 The Sowetan has been generally friendly to the progressive side of South African politics, 
but has justifiably become critical of the World Cup due to the fears of this event as a waste of 
money. In total, the Sowetan and selected international media have been fairly neutral, if not 
favorable towards the South African World Cup. There have been vocal critics, both 
domestically and internationally, as there are with any large scale investment project, due to the 
potential ramifications of diverting these funds, but overall the writers for these selected 
publications have been positive, as they have highlighted many of the major political ideas that 
can bring national unity and international recognition.  
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SECTION VII: SHADOW CASE WITH BRAZIL 
 South Africa, as the first and only African nation to host a World Cup, does not have any 
clear regional comparisons. However, economically and politically, it is very similar to the last 
two World Cup hosts: Brazil (2014) and Russia (2018), as all three of these nations are BRICS 
countries. With the close proximity of the Russian World Cup to writing this, there has not been 
enough time to analyze even the short or long term effects on the state, nor has the Russian 
government put out any official statistics from the competition. However, Brazil does make for a 
solid comparison with South Africa. Brazil has not released any official data for the 2014 World 
Cup, potentially due to the transition in government and hosting the 2016 Olympics in Brazil, 
which has given additional usage and spiked tourism to Brazil.  
 Due to this latter factor, I am not able to do a full scale comparison of the two nations, as 
Brazil has been able to utilize some of the stadiums for the Olympics. In addition, many of the 
infrastructure projects that were completed were used for the subsequent sporting event, which 
confounds that set. However, I have analyzed their stadiums, with data gathered from scholarly 
reviews of both the stadium process. Brazil has not released employment numbers for the World 
Cup either, which makes the regression that I ran using the South African data impossible to 
compare to Brazil. Thus, I will be using Brazil as a more theoretical approach, with less of a 
focus on data and more on the lasting effects and legacies on the nation. In terms of case study 
options, I will be utilizing a “shadow” case, where two similar cases are explored in a typical 
case study manner, but the latter or shadow is used in an auxiliary manner to the primary case.69 
With the difference in available data, yet the clear similarities between the two nations, a shadow 
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case will be able to provide another example to compare the results from South Africa’s 2010 
World Cup.  
 2014 WORLD CUP BIDDING PROCESS: 
In 2003, FIFA selected South America as the next region for the rotational World Cup.70 
However, only two nations had interest to host the games: Brazil and Colombia. Due to internal 
complications, Colombia withdrew their bid before the FIFA Executive Committee could meet, 
leaving Brazil, as the only formal bid for the 2014 World Cup.71 Thus in his made Brazil the de 
facto host despite Brazilian President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva doubting the feasibility of the 
event, by stating, “We don't have any stadium which is in a condition to host World Cup games. 
We’re going to have to build at least twelve new stadiums in this country.” The bid was officially 
confirmed by FIFA October 20, 2007, despite the uphill battle to build twelve stadiums before 
the 2013 Confederation’s Cup. This lack of infrastructure would require significant planning and 
progress, which Brazil did successfully complete before the 2013 Confederations Cup and 2014 
World Cup. Brazil renovated five stadiums and fully constructed seven new stadiums in twelve 
cities. These cities were regionally spread out in twelve different states, where all parts of the 
country had some form of access to a World Cup venue. This did allow for the World Cup in 
Brazil to truly be a national game, but it led to complications with venues, as some stadiums 
were constructed in thinly populated regions. However, the lack of competition for bids led to 
the change in policy where the World Cup would not have regions set for each set of games.   
Regarding the 2014 World Cup, we must also consider the subsequent Olympic Games 
that were held in Rio de Janeiro in 2016.  With holding the two largest sporting events in the 
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world, there would be some overlap between the facilities used, especially the Maracanã 
Stadium, which hosted the seven matches for the World Cup and four matches for the Summer 
Olympics, including the championship and gold medal games for both the men’s and women’s 
teams, as well as the opening ceremonies. In total, six venues overlapped between the two 
competitions.  
However, when construction is considered, we must factor in the bidding process. The 
World Cup was awarded to Brazil in October 2007, while the Olympics were awarded to Brazil 
in October 2009, leaving two years of planning completely separate from the event. In terms of 
stadiums, the Olympics only utilized six of the twelve stadiums constructed for the World Cup, 
while building the Estádio Olímpico72 specifically for the Olympic Games, despite the numerous 
stadiums constructed for the World Cup. The focus of this will be on the building directly for the 
World Cup, but there will be inherent overflow, especially with infrastructure projects that were 
constructed in anticipation of both events.  
BRAZIL DATA: 
 Brazil has not put out official numbers on the World Cup as South Africa did in late 2012 
after the competition. However, FIFA initially predicted in their reports that the total stadium 
construction would cost roughly 6 billion Brazilian real. The final costs were unsurprisingly 
higher, as the World Cup generally costs more than the predicted values in the bid book—as seen 
in South Africa, but not as dramatic as South Africa, with an average of 41% increase per 
stadium. The total overrun was just over 2.5 billion real. Estadio Mineirao actually was cheaper 
at the end, with a 7% decrease in costs, while Estadio Castelao was statistically even on cost. 
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Overall, three stadiums nearly doubled in cost: Arena Pantanal (88% increase), Arena de 
Baixada (95% increase), Estadio Nacional Mane Garrincha (101% increase). This increase is 
significantly less than the South African data, but overall the cost of the stadiums were higher in 
Brazil. Thus Brazil has more accurately budgeted the World Cup for 2014. However, Brazil 
spent on average 711 million Brazillian Real per stadium (341 million USD) while South Africa 
spent 1.598 billion rand per stadium (180 million USD). This nearly twofold increase is not due 
to inflation, as both the Real and the Rand stayed fairly consistent in relation to the US dollar 
from 2004 to 2014, with both experiencing the same devaluation in late 2008 and early 2009.  
Thus the impact was that Brazil had significantly more expensive stadiums, even when adjusting 
for inflation and time change than South Africa.  
 In terms of political stability and economic impacts, Brazil has not released employment 
data from the World Cup, thus there are only estimates on the impact on construction jobs per 
stadium. Due to this, I cannot do the same regressions that were done on South Africa as there is 
no comparable variable to replace employment data. With this lack of available data, I have 
decided to merely present the data without regression analysis, and compare the raw data to the 
overall consequences and changes in South Africa.  
 Thus when looking at the data writ large, you can see similar changes to that occurred in 
South Africa. South Africa as a whole had GDP growth of 22.63% from the World Cup bid to 
the event, while Brazil experienced a 28.39% growth in their period from the bid to the World 
Cup. In terms of provincial growth, the regions with stadiums had an average of 25.76% growth 
in Brazil, while in South Africa, they had a 22.57% growth. The deviation between scores can be 
attributed to the fact that nine of South Africa’s ten provinces were used for stadiums—with 
Northern Cape, the least populated and smallest economic province—being excluded, while 
	 Avdellas 48 
Brazil had stadiums in twelve of its twenty-seven. Overall, the data between the two in the World 
Cup period was fairly similar in terms of economic change up until the World Cup, with Brazil 
having a higher rate of growth from their bid to World Cup.   
 In terms of governance and stability scores, Brazil has had similar fluctuations as South 
Africa, with a high of 51.18 in 2009 and a low of -0.41 in 2017. During the World Cup, their 
score was a -0.07 (43rd percentile), which is just slightly lower than South Africa’s -0.03 (45th 
percentile) in 2010. The two nations have been extremely similar over nearly the past two 
decades, with South Africa being on average slightly higher. The graph below shows the 
differences in both nations over the period from 2003 to 2017.  
 
Politically, Brazil has had a dramatically different result than South Africa, as the 
incumbent party—the Worker’s Party—had lost control of the presidency in 2018 for the first 
time since 2002. Their vote share for the presidency dropped 12.3% between the World Cup and 
the next election, while South Africa’s ANC only lost 3.97% in their first election after the 
World Cup. Brazil did have major issues with corruption and external factors. However, some of 
the corruption that was attributed to the Worker’s Party’s loss was part of the World Cup, as five 
stadiums (which included the three most expensive stadiums) were constructed by companies 
indicted in “Lava Jato,” or Operation Car Wash. Reports have stated that 1.5 billion real (720 
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million USD) derived from these five stadiums were for fraudulent payments to the companies 
and government officials.73  Sergio Cabral, the former governor of Rio de Janeiro state, was 
arrested and sentenced to 14 years in prison for accepting $64 million in bribes connected to 
construction for the World Cup.74 This direct connection—while not the only instance of 
corruption—shows how the World Cup may have influenced governance in Brazil after the 
World Cup.  
BRAZIL’S STADIUMS: 
 Brazil built seven new stadiums, while renovating five stadiums for the 2014 World Cup. 
In total, the twelve stadiums—in twelve distinct regions—created a World Cup that was 
regionally distributed, but incurred long distances between matches for teams. This ensured that 
all of Brazil could be a part of the World Cup, but left many stadiums in low population areas.   
 The World Cup was well attended, with over 3.4 million total fans and over 98% of seats 
filled on average for the tournament. This is higher than South Africa, who averaged just under 
93% for the tournament overall. The lowest attended stadium—Arena Pernambuco—still filled 
over 96% of their seats on average, compared to South Africa’s lowest stadium of just over 80%. 
Brazil’s World Cup had the second most fans total, with approximately 120,000 fans fewer than 
the United States World Cup in 1994.  In total, the World Cup for Brazil, in terms of the actual 
event, was fairly successful.  
 As a more soccer friendly nation, Brazil’s stadiums are for the most part still used by 
major clubs, as Brazil’s Campeonato Brasileiro Série A, is one of the most competitive club 
leagues in the world. Thus their stadiums, aside from Arena de Amazonia—the most criticized 
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stadium, have at least one tenant. Seven of the eleven remaining stadiums have a Série A team as 
a tenant, while Estadio Nacional Mane Garrincha hosts the Brazilian national team. Brazil’s 
stadiums, much like South Africa’s, are fairly well used after the World Cup. The Arena de 
Amazonia, which was built in the rainforest in a site with limited access. The expenses for the 
stadium nearly triple the revenue, and this has been seen by the international media as one of the 
largest “white elephants” in terms of modern construction pieces.75  
 Overall, South Africa’s World Cup has been seen as more positive by the international 
community. Brazil’s stadiums are consistently mentioned as “white elephants,” especially with 
the need to build new stadiums for the Olympics even after the construction of the World Cup 
stadium, while South Africa’s have lost that terminology. This could be due to a recency bias, as 
Brazil’s World Cup was the focus preceding the 2018 Russian World Cup. The dramatically 
higher costs in total ($4.09 billion) compared to South Africa’s $1.8 billion also factor into the 
disparity between the two games, as the fact that the event—without a change in the number of 
teams competing or any major inflationary factors—had more than doubled the cost of the 
previous World Cup. South Africa, just four years earlier, built essentially six new stadiums and 
renovated four for less than half of the cost that Brazil built seven new stadiums and renovated 
five.  This number does not include infrastructure spending, which Brazil also outpaced South 
Africa in. Thus with the dramatic differences in stadium spending alone, we can see stark 
differences between the two similar nations.  
 Brazil also has hosted the World Cup before, as it was the host nation in 1950 and 
currently is one of only five nations to host the World Cup twice, along with Italy, France, 
Germany, and Mexico. South America has also hosted the World Cup five times, from Uruguay 
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hosting the first World Cup in 1930, along with Chile and Argentina in 1962 and 1978 
respectively.  Thus, Brazil would gain less prestige from hosting the World Cup than a nation 
like South Africa, who has not had any of the major international mega sporting events on their 
continent. This indicates that the geopolitical and soft power gains that could be achieved via a 
World Cup would be less than South Africa’s. In addition, the two events in a two-year period: 
with the World Cup in summer 2014 and the Olympic games in summer 2016, lead to a 
lessening of the impact as well.  If the goal of an international mega sporting event is to prove 
legitimacy for the nation, then there is no need for a second event in that short of a time period to 
prove this to the international community. Thus the effects of the World Cup were reduced by 
the subsequent Olympic games.  
Overall, the significantly higher costs from the World Cup in Brazil, along with the 
heightened international media focus on stadiums like the Arena de Amazonia, the government 
turnover and corruption, and the reduced geopolitical impact, make the South African World 
Cup more successful when examined in terms of both economic and political legacies. 
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SECTION VIII: CONCLUSION 
 
I have completed a regression analysis of the GDP change per region, and compared it to 
the costs of the stadium and the amount of employed workers for the eight provinces that had a 
stadium built, as well as the nation at large. I have left Northern Cape isolated, as they were the 
lone province that did not have a stadium used for competition. I ran three different models: one 
with the total GDP change from 2001 to 2013, one from the year of the bid to the year of the 
competition (2004-2010) and one from the bid to two years after to see the greater impact two 
years removed from the World Cup (2004-2012).  
 Additionally, I have looked at this data compared to the seats changed by the incumbent 
party in the South African parliament. Over the past three decades, the same party—the African 
National Congress (ANC) has dominated the political landscape of South Africa. The ANC has 
won every national election since Apartheid fell and the voting system was integrated. However, 
there has been a tremendous amount of fluctuations in the number of votes that the ANC has 
received, which serves as the key indicator in the data set.  
 There have been other political factors outside of the World Cup that have affected voting 
patterns, but the World Cup was a major economic investment for the nation at large. Total 
spending by the federal government, including security, infrastructure, and the ten stadiums 
constructed, cost over 30 billion rand, with the vast majority going towards stadium construction 
and transportation infrastructure (9.841 billion rand and 11.728 billion rand respectively). The 
South African government stated that the infrastructure investment was needed to improve the 
nation, and that the World Cup merely shortened the timeframe for completing these projects. 
The government states that these projects will continue to be a long term investment, as the 
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benefits of these projects will continue to serve South Africa regardless of the World Cup’s 
impact. The graph below shows the full spending breakdown of the World Cup.  
 
 In terms of stadium spending alone, the nation’s report stated that in total, stadiums cost 
15.982 billion rand, with the federal government giving 9.841 billion rand towards this project. 
The remaining 6.14 billion was paid for at the local level, with cities and regional governments 
paying for this share. The exceptions to this would be Loftus Versfeld Stadium and Royal 
Bafokeng Stadium, as the former is a privately owned rugby stadium that ownership paid for the 
minor upgrades for the competition. The latter was partially funded by the both the federal and 
local government, but the majority of the cost was from the Royal Bafokeng Nation—an ethnic 
region governed in a hybrid system by both South Africa and the traditional monarchal rule. 
These two private stadiums had the lowest costs of all stadiums, at 115 million rand and 150 
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million rand, respectively.76  Based upon budgeting estimates from South Africa, the total spent 
on the World Cup by the federal government is equivalent to 80% of the national defense budget 
and more than allocated for numerous sections, including social security, provincial welfare 
services, HIV and Aids support, and environmental protection. In official government documents 
describing the tax revenue and budget for 2010, they use a soccer ball as the center of the 
descriptive chart with the spending breakdowns, showing that at the national level, this 
tournament was the focus and pride of the nation.77 The government fully embraced the World 
Cup as a means of soft power, and thus this spending was perceived to be an investment in the 
future of South Africa. 
Instead of utilizing the World Cup as a means of increasing tax revenue, South Africa 
created numerous tax exemptions that allowed FIFA and all national associations (other than 
SAFA) to operate under tax free conditions. Commercial affiliates, such licensees, broadcasters, 
merchandising partners, and other FIFA-designated service providers also received some tax 
exemptions for certain World Cup related goods. This legislation was passed specifically for the 
World Cup, as the period of time that was covered was the 2009 Confederation’s Cup and then a 
five-week period, beginning one week before the first kickoff of the 2010 World Cup and ending 
the night of the championship game.78 FIFA, as a “non commercial, not for profit” organization 
claims to not request tax exemptions or an easing of customs79 for the World Cup, but these 
benefits are almost always granted for the event, as there is an individual section in each of the 
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bids within the FIFA Inspection Report that discusses the tax-free status.80 FIFA operates on a 
four year budget schedule, with the year of the World Cup being the conclusion of a cycle. Thus, 
FIFA put its official report out in June 2011 for the previous four years. FIFA was able to profit 
nearly $631 million, with a total revenue of 4.189 billion and expenditure of 3.558 billion during 
that period, with $3.48 billion in revenue coming from the broadcasting and marketing rights for 
the 2010 World Cup alone.81  
 When looking at the South African 2010 World Cup, the conclusions must be done in 
three separate aspects: the quantifiable political economy aspect, the internal social cohesion and 
perception factor, and finally the soft power, international relations dynamic. These areas, when 
combined, paint a clearer picture of the total effect of hosting the World Cup for South Africa.  
First, we must examine the quantifiable economic data. In the five regressions that 
analyzed the impacts of stadium construction costs, employment, GDP growth, and seat change, 
we saw no relation between seat change and GDP change, total stadium cost, or employment 
created by the stadiums. The data points are limited, as there are only nine provinces with ten 
stadiums over a short period of time, however, we can assume from this that there is not a 
significant relationship between political stability and the World Cup. This betrays my initial 
reactions, as I would assume that the loss of votes consistently over the three elections would 
have some relation to the World Cup spending, as the ANC peaked at 69.6% in 2004, just before 
the World Cup bid was officially announced and then fell by 3.798% and 3.746% in the next two 
elections nationwide.  
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 I do, however, think the most significant event is at a local level. Gauteng, the smallest 
yet most populous province in South Africa, had three stadiums for the World Cup: First 
National Bank Stadium, Ellis Park Stadium, and Loftus Versfeld Stadium.  All three were 
existing stadiums that were renovated for the World Cup, at a total cost of 4.06 billion Rand, 
with 61,870 employed for construction alone. This region individually had the biggest drop in 
voting for the ANC, dropping by nearly ten percent from 2009 to 2014. Johannesburg, the 
nation’s capitol, is seated in Gauteng, which can attribute part of this political change as it is a 
smaller, more salient region, but the large difference from both the past election (a decline of 
13.812% from 2004 to 2014 versus the national average of 7.544%) to the 2014 election, which 
was nearly three times as large as the decline of the average, and the largest decline of any 
province. In terms of usage, these three stadiums are utilized by major clubs, with FNB Stadium 
being used for the South African National Team for friendlies and as the home stadium for the 
Kaizer Chiefs, and Ellis Park and Louis Versfeld Stadiums being used for the nation’s premier 
rugby teams. Outside of FNB Stadium, the other two Gauteng stadiums have not received the 
record number of attendees since the World Cup, which expanded the capacities of all three 
stadiums.  
 In a similar vein, the second largest decline in ANC votes from 2009 to 2014—was in 
Mpumalanga, which had a newly constructed stadium for the 2010 World Cup. This stadium was 
the cheapest newly constructed stadium of any of the World Cub stadiums, at 960 million Rand, 
but was paid for by taxes in the region. Mpumalanga has had the largest increase in real GDP 
from 2004 to 2012, at a 54% increase over that period. Yet, the stadium’s upkeep costs continue 
to place a burden on tax payers. This source of discontent for a stadium that was only used for 
four games during the competition, has led to a dramatic change in voting. From 2004 to 2009, 
	 Avdellas 57 
the ANC only lost .5% in votes, yet in the aftermath of the World Cup, the 2014 election showed 
over a 7% decline in votes. This dramatic difference in just five years does show that there may 
be some discontent within the local population when forced to bear the brunt of a stadium cost.  
 In terms of political stability, the nation overall has been stable, as overall the data has 
been fairly consistent. During the World Cup year, the nation had a -0.03 score, which places it 
at the 45th percentile in the international community. This is slightly lower than its peak of .22 
(50.72 percentile rank) in 2007, but still higher than both of its low points (2003 and 2017) at      
-0.31 and -0.27 respectively. Considering the impact of security on the political stability index, 
along with the mass influx of tourists, this score in 2010 does show that South Africa was fairly 
stable during the World Cup. Overall, the nation has fluctuated between the 35th and 45th 
percentile after the World Cup. This data is not available at a regional level, as the political 
stability and governance score index does not break down at a small level, so thus it could not be 
included in the data set. I have attached a graph below showing the changes in political stability 
in the nation from before the World Cup to 2017.  This percentage change cannot be solely 
attributed to the World Cup, as discussed in the election section that there are numerous other 
impacting variables, but this does show a national ranking compared to the rest of the 
international community. Overall, the fluctuations in data have not been tremendously large in 
either direction, with the difference in world percentile rank being just over 15 percentile points. 
As a comparison, the United States, United Kingdom, and Germany, which are seen as fairly 
stable developed nations, have ranged by 29.76, 17.84, and 16.8 percentage points respectively.82  
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 However, when we look directly at GDP change against the stadium cost and 
employment opportunities, we do see a significant result when looking from the World Cup bid 
in 2004 to 2012. Thus there is at least some correlation between the GDP change in each 
individual province and the stadium costs. These massive development projects at least 
somewhat do contribute to the economic changes, especially with the high number of employed 
citizens, and have affected the nation at a regional level. The full data sets and regression 
documents are attached in the appendix.   
 Overall, the economic impact of hosting a mega sporting event has proven to be at best 
neutral for South Africa, as their real GDP has increased steadily from 2004 to 2013, but the debt 
to GDP ratio has increased tremendously since its low in 2008 as it was reported to have a 53.1 
Debt to GDP ratio in 2017, which is an all time high for the Rainbow Nation. For individual 
provinces, most have seen GDP growth from the World Cup to 2012, but several provinces had 
negative growth: Western Cape between 2007 and 2008, both Free State and North West from 
2008 to 2009 and from 2011 to 2012, Eastern Cape from 2007 to 2008 and 2010 to 2011, and 
Mpumalanga from 2012 to 2013. In 2009, the entire nation had a decline of -1.54%, with six 
provinces having declines. Thus, twelve of the sixty-four periods (18.75%) shown had negative 
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GDP growth in the immediate impact of the World Cup. Northern Cape, the lone region without 
a stadium, had a negative GDP twice in the same isolated period of eight years (25%).  
The World Cup did have a tremendous impact during the four-week competition, as 
South Africa reported increases in retail sales, restaurant income, credit card spending, and other 
major spending areas. The issue with this effect is that tourism is a temporary increase that 
inflates the statistics during the competition. Despite the short term increase, as the competition 
was less than a decade ago, the negative consequences of these stadiums can be seen. However, 
if South Africa would host another mega sporting event, which has been shown in their attempts 
to bid for the 2023 Women’s World Cup, it could repurpose its existing stadiums for this purpose 
without major infrastructure or construction costs. However, this is not a guarantee at all for the 
future and South Africa needs to be able to support these massive structures internally without 
the dependence on the international sporting community.  
Outside of the economic effects, there are two major political effects: domestic and 
international. We can see that the political leaders of South Africa had hoped to use the World 
Cup to increase domestic tranquility and to increase their soft power relationship in the 
international community.  
In terms of domestic policy, we must look at the two factors: social cohesion and self-
image, with both stemming from the marred historic past of South Africa. Leaders used the 2010 
World Cup to prove that there was not a divide in the population. The bid was announced just a 
decade after the fall of apartheid so these wounds were still fresh. As seen with the media, there 
were initial fears of civil unrest, with threats of violence and racial tensions, but this was 
ultimately wrong, as the World Cup was fairly secure and well run. When looking at the self 
image, we can look to SAFA President Danny Jordaan, who stated that, “For years, many South 
	 Avdellas 60 
Africans have been told that they are inferior, that they are not good enough. The nation has 
crossed a huge psychological barrier.” Jordaan embodies the spirit of the national leaders, as this 
is one of the domestic goals of the 2010 World Cup. The mere fact that South Africa was the first 
African nation to host the mega sporting event gives a sense of national pride to the oft put down 
nation.  
In terms of soft power and international relations, I would conclude that South Africa was 
fairly successful, especially with the increased pressure of being the first African nation to host a 
World Cup. The expectations from the media, especially the Western powers, was that the event 
would fail as South Africa could not handle it.  
South Africa is a member of the United Nations, and was the one of charter members of 
the international organization, signing on in 1945. However, for the first sixty years of the 
international community, it was never elected to be a rotating member of the UN Security 
Council, which is one of the highest levels of international recognition that a nation could get. 
There is a designated rotating spot on the council for Africa, so it was not seen as a regional 
power on the continent.  Since it was awarded the World Cup in 2004, it has been elected to the 
Security Council three times, serving from 2006-2008, from 2010-2012, and is currently serving 
from 2018 until the end of 2020. It may be just coincidence, as South Africa did have issues with 
apartheid tainting its image to the international community and was largely isolationist before the 
turn of the 21st Century, but they were elected for their first term two years after their bid was 
confirmed. This may be due to South Africa wanting to take a bigger role in the international 
community and the World Cup could be part of the same pattern, but also shows the newfound 
legitimacy that the international community perceives of South Africa.   
	 Avdellas 61 
When focusing on just the “showcase effect,” alone we can see the potential for 
international recognition for South Africa. 52 of the 64 matches had over 50 million viewers in 
the 11 major markets, including the United States, United Kingdom, Germany, and Italy, along 
with an average of 70 million viewers per match internationally.  The event was, at the time, the 
largest period of sustained activity in Twitter’s history, with an average of 750 tweets per second 
during the competition.83 The international media, with large publications in both the United 
States and the United Kingdom, considered the World Cup to be a success, despite their initial 
fears of not only a poorly run event, but an unsafe event. With this seal of approval by “western 
media” sources, South Africa has gained a new position in the international community. These 
factors, at least at the surface level, indicate that South Africa’s goal of gaining international 
awareness via the World Cup was successful.   
When looking at all three outcomes from the World Cup: the political economy, the 
domestic social effects, and the international relations conclusions, I would say that the World 
Cup for South Africa achieved its goal that was set out by its political leaders. Thus my initial 
hypothesis was partially incorrect, as I expected that mega construction in developing nations 
would have a negative effect on the political and economic climate. South Africa proved that it 
could hold a successful mega sporting event, while breaking free of the traditional imagery that 
its leaders believed shackled the nation. South Africa—despite the economic effects that 
continue to linger—has emerged from the World Cup in a better role politically. In the aftermath 
of the World Cup and on the international stage, President Mbeki was correct: Africa’s time has 
finally come.   
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SECTION IX: FURTHER WORKS 
 Looking at South Africa in a macro context, we can examine this mega construction 
project as just one of many large scale building project in the Global South. These projects have 
merit, despite both their high initial construction costs and the long lasting cost of maintaining 
these after construction, that can lead to increase political legitimacy, both domestically and in 
the international community.  
 To compare this to other building projects, the South African government funded 
approximately 28.5 billion rand in multiple areas, with over 6 billion rand spent by city 
governments and private organizations on the stadiums alone. This total, 34.6 billion rand, is 
approximately $3.9 billion USD in total investment. In terms of comparable mega construction 
projects in the developing world, there are very few that compare to the total cost of a World 
Cup, since it is ten stadiums and massive upgrades to infrastructure and ports. However, if seen 
as individual projects, such as just the infrastructure ($1.3 billion) or individual stadiums—
ranging from $12 million to $507 million, we can compare them to other projects in the 
developing world. These individual pieces, which did total a significant amount, must be looked 
at in this manner, as the total cost can only be compared to other mega sporting events, such as 
the 2014 World Cup or Olympic Games. When looking at the individual and regional level, the 
conclusions drawn in this thesis can be expanded.  
 In looking at the political effects of these construction projects, it is tough to separate the 
emotional effects of the sport from these stadiums, as other upgrades in the developing world, 
such as dams and railways, may have more practicality but do not have the inherent national 
pride that is part of a global sporting event. In this manner, I would say that sporting events are 
unique. That is, these events may be less necessary, if even necessary at all, but they evoke 
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feelings that a dam could not. The non-quantifiable factors that were gained from not only seeing 
the Bafana Bafana compete at an international level, but compete in stadiums built by South 
Africans for South Africa cannot be overstated.  
 If further research was to be done on South Africa, I would want to examine the effects of 
the infrastructure system, as this was supposed to be the necessary part for the future, while the 
stadiums primary purpose was for the single event. The success and failures of the upgraded 
infrastructure, which the government claimed was aged and needed repaired could be a major 
point of study for future analysis. In doing this analysis with the combined parts on the 
infrastructure development, it could lend further credence to the World Cup as a success, as the 
World Cup was not only a success in terms of soft power relations and domestic stability, but 
also a catalyst for true infrastructure upgrades within the nation.  
 This research can be applied to the future of developing nations hosting mega sporting 
events, as numerous developing nations are bidding for future Olympics and World Cups. 
Nations on both ends of the political and economic spectrum, from “Western” nations like the 
United States to places such as the hinted joint bid from North and South Korea. If we can apply 
not only the economic indicators, but the soft power and geopolitical effects on these nations, we 
can identify whether a nation can successfully parlay hosting a mega sporting event into greater 
international recognition and a more balanced geopolitical landscape.  
  
Gross Domestic Product
Region Built Stadium 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
South Africa 10 Stadiums 439559 455682 469121 490487 516371
Eastern Cape Nelson Mandela Bay Stadium 35446.9 34345.8 36472.7 37820 39636.2
Free State Free State Stadium 23519.3 25559.8 25294.6 26114.4 26918.6
Gauteng 3 Stadiums 145864 154721 160125 167932 177458
KwaZulu-Natal Moses Mabhida 72695.1 75099 77650.9 81042.5 85284.9
Limpopo Peter Mokaba 29310.1 30239.9 30531.7 31855.9 34145.5
Mpumalanga Mbombela Stadium 31891.2 32121.1 31837.1 32528.3 33883.6
Northern Cape None Construction 9806.16 9558.2 10041.3 10466.4 10618
North West Royal Bafokeng 29355.8 29706.8 29872 30785 33642.4
Western Cape Cape Town Stadium 61670.8 64330.4 67295.8 71942.7 74783.8
Totals of Stadium Provinces 429753.2 446123.8 459079.8 480020.8 505753
GDP Change Per Year
Region Built Stadium 2001 2002 Net Difference Percent Change 2003
South Africa 10 Stadiums 439559 455682 16123 3.67% 469121
Eastern Cape Nelson Mandela Bay Stadium 35446.9 34345.8 -1101.1 -3.11% 36472.7
Free State Free State Stadium 23519.3 25559.8 2040.5 8.68% 25294.6
Gauteng 3 Stadiums 145864 154721 8857 6.07% 160125
KwaZulu-Natal Moses Mabhida 72695.1 75099 2403.9 3.31% 77650.9
Limpopo Peter Mokaba 29310.1 30239.9 929.8 3.17% 30531.7
Mpumalanga Mbombela Stadium 31891.2 32121.1 229.9 0.72% 31837.1
Northern Cape None Construction 9806.16 9558.2 -247.96 -2.53% 10041.3
North West Royal Bafokeng 29355.8 29706.8 351 1.20% 29872
Western Cape Cape Town Stadium 61670.8 64330.4 2659.6 4.31% 67295.8
Gross Domestic Product
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
545307 574537 592871 583752 601498 621516 636698 649803
42146.1 45824 43562.7 44512.4 46316 46210.7 49133.3 50139.8
30008.3 31052.2 32464.5 31644.4 32217.5 32416.2 32170.3 33052.8
186340 193011 200683 197322 205134 211455 214712 219549
89070.5 93748 98286.9 95136.8 94962.4 98730.6 102103 103920
36255.8 38232.8 40772.4 42351.3 44257.5 45849.4 46685.6 47231.7
36369.8 39959.6 42409.2 42471 44412 46545.9 50412 49615.6
11939.4 13031.9 13696.4 12674.4 13152.7 13219.1 13427.3 13079.8
34638.3 36346.6 38219.1 37797.3 39447.9 42250.4 40911.3 43944.9
78538.8 83330.7 82777.1 79842.3 81597.6 84838.8 87143.5 89269.8
533367.6 561504.9 579174.9 571077.5 588344.9 608297 623271 636723.6
Net Difference Percent Change 2004 Net DifferencePercent Change 2005 Net DifferencePercent Change
13439 2.95% 490487 37489 7.99% 516371 25884 5.28%
2126.9 6.19% 37820 246.2 0.68% 39636.2 1816.2 4.80%
-265.2 -1.04% 26114.4 2860.3 11.31% 26918.6 804.2 3.08%
5404 3.49% 167932 16664 10.41% 177458 9526 5.67%
2551.9 3.40% 81042.5 5795.5 7.46% 85284.9 4242.4 5.23%
291.8 0.96% 31855.9 2254 7.38% 34145.5 2289.6 7.19%
-284 -0.88% 32528.3 921.1 2.89% 33883.6 1355.3 4.17%
483.1 5.05% 10466.4 177.14 1.76% 10618 151.6 1.45%
165.2 0.56% 30785 1264 4.23% 33642.4 2857.4 9.28%
2965.4 4.61% 71942.7 7306.5 10.86% 74783.8 2841.1 3.95%
Gross Domestic Product
Change 2001-2013 Increase (%) Change 2004-2010 Increase (%) Change 2004-2012 % Change
210244 47.83% 111011 22.63% 146211 29.81%
14692.9 41.45% 8496 22.46% 11313.3 29.91%
9533.5 40.53% 6103.1 23.37% 6055.9 23.19%
73685 50.52% 37202 22.15% 46780 27.86%
31224.9 42.95% 13919.9 17.18% 21060.5 25.99%
17921.6 61.14% 12401.6 38.93% 14829.7 46.55%
17724.4 55.58% 11883.7 36.53% 17883.7 54.98%
3273.64 33.38% 2686.3 25.67% 2960.9 28.29%
14589.1 49.70% 8662.9 28.14% 10126.3 32.89%
27599 44.75% 9654.9 13.42% 15200.8 21.13%
206970.4 108324.1 0.225665429 143250.2 0.298424985
2006 Net DifferencePercent Change 2007 Net Difference Percent Change 2008 Net Difference
545307 28936 5.60% 574537 29230 5.36% 592871 18334
42146.1 2509.9 6.33% 45824 3677.9 8.73% 43562.7 -2261.3
30008.3 3089.7 11.48% 31052.2 1043.9 3.48% 32464.5 1412.3
186340 8882 5.01% 193011 6671 3.58% 200683 7672
89070.5 3785.6 4.44% 93748 4677.5 5.25% 98286.9 4538.9
36255.8 2110.3 6.18% 38232.8 1977 5.45% 40772.4 2539.6
36369.8 2486.2 7.34% 39959.6 3589.8 9.87% 42409.2 2449.6
11939.4 1321.4 12.44% 13031.9 1092.5 9.15% 13696.4 664.5
34638.3 995.9 2.96% 36346.6 1708.3 4.93% 38219.1 1872.5
78538.8 3755 5.02% 83330.7 4791.9 6.10% 82777.1 -553.6
Gross Domestic Product
Percent Change 2009 Net DifferencePercent Change 2010 Net DifferencePercent Change 2011 Net Difference
3.19% 583752 -9119 -1.54% 601498 17746 3.04% 621516 20018
-4.93% 44512.4 949.7 2.18% 46316 1803.6 4.05% 46210.7 -105.3
4.55% 31644.4 -820.1 -2.53% 32217.5 573.1 1.81% 32416.2 198.7
3.97% 197322 -3361 -1.67% 205134 7812 3.96% 211455 6321
4.84% 95136.8 -3150.1 -3.21% 94962.4 -174.4 -0.18% 98730.6 3768.2
6.64% 42351.3 1578.9 3.87% 44257.5 1906.2 4.50% 45849.4 1591.9
6.13% 42471 61.8 0.15% 44412 1941 4.57% 46545.9 2133.9
5.10% 12674.4 -1022 -7.46% 13152.7 478.3 3.77% 13219.1 66.4
5.15% 37797.3 -421.8 -1.10% 39447.9 1650.6 4.37% 42250.4 2802.5
-0.66% 79842.3 -2934.8 -3.55% 81597.6 1755.3 2.20% 84838.8 3241.2
Gross Domestic Product
Percent Change 2012 Net DifferencePercent Change 2013 Net Difference Percent Change
3.33% 636698 15182 2.44% 649803 13105 2.06%
-0.23% 49133.3 2922.6 6.32% 50139.8 1006.5 2.05%
0.62% 32170.3 -245.9 -0.76% 33052.8 882.5 2.74%
3.08% 214712 3257 1.54% 219549 4837 2.25%
3.97% 102103 3372.4 3.42% 103920 1817 1.78%
3.60% 46685.6 836.2 1.82% 47231.7 546.1 1.17%
4.80% 50412 3866.1 8.31% 49615.6 -796.4 -1.58%
0.50% 13427.3 208.2 1.57% 13079.8 -347.5 -2.59%
7.10% 40911.3 -1339.1 -3.17% 43944.9 3033.6 7.42%
3.97% 87143.5 2304.7 2.72% 89269.8 2126.3 2.44%
Stadium Data
Stadium State Original Built Date Renovation Proj Cost 2003 Proj Cost 2006 Actual (Rand)
Nelson Mandela Bay Stadium Eastern Cape 2010 250000000 981000000 1850000000
Free State Stadium Free State 1995 2007 37500000 221000000 253000000
FNB (First National Bank) Stadium Gauteng 1989 2009 195000000 1560000000 3700000000
Ellis Park Stadium Gauteng 1928 2009 34375000 230000000 254000000
Loftus Versfeld Stadium Gauteng 1923 2008 15000000 99000000 115000000
Moses Mabhida KwaZulu-Natal 2009 53750000 1830000000 3100000000
Peter Mokaba Limpopo 2010 150000000 176000000 1100000000
Mbombela Stadium Mpumalanga 2009 300000000 875000000 960000000
Royal Bafokeng  North West 1999 2009 11250000 147000000 150000000
Cape Town Stadium Western Cape 2009 14375000 1960000000 4500000000
Totals: 1061250000 8079000000 15982000000
1598200000
Averages: 1598200000
Stadium Data
Rand to USD Employed Change 2003-2006 Change 2006-Actual Change 2003-Actual % 2003-2006 % 2006-Actual % 2003-Actual
208579965 15200 731000000 869000000 1600000000 292.40% 88.58% 640.00%
28524719.54 2500 183500000 32000000 215500000 489.33% 14.48% 574.67%
417159930.1 58300 1365000000 2140000000 3505000000 700.00% 137.18% 1797.44%
28637465.47 2700 195625000 24000000 219625000 569.09% 10.43% 638.91%
12965781.61 870 84000000 16000000 100000000 560.00% 16.16% 666.67%
349512373.9 18200 1776250000 1270000000 3046250000 3304.65% 69.40% 5667.44%
124020519.8 6800 26000000 924000000 950000000 17.33% 525.00% 633.33%
108236090 70000 575000000 85000000 660000000 191.67% 9.71% 220.00%
16911889.06 450 135750000 3000000 138750000 1206.67% 2.04% 1233.33%
507356671.7 65000 1945625000 2540000000 4485625000 13534.78% 129.59% 31204.35%
1801905406 240020 7017750000 7903000000 14920750000 661.27% 97.82% 1405.96%
180190540.6
180190540.6
Attendance
Stadium Capacity Total Attendance Matches Total Capacity Average Attendance Percent Attended
Free State Stadium 40911 196823 6 245466 32803.83333 80.18%
Peter Mokaba 41733 139436 4 166932 34859 83.53%
Royal Bafokeng 38646 193697 6 231876 32282.83333 83.53%
Nelson Mandela Bay Stadium 42486 285643 8 339888 35705.375 84.04%
Mbombela Stadium 40929 143492 4 163716 35873 87.65%
Loftus Versfeld Stadium 42858 234092 6 257148 39015.33333 91.03%
Ellis Park Stadium 55686 372843 7 389802 53263.28571 95.65%
Moses Mabhida 62760 434631 7 439320 62090.14286 98.93%
Cape Town Stadium 64100 507340 8 512800 63417.5 98.94%
FNB (First National Bank) Stadium 84490 670809 8 675920 83851.125 99.24%
514599 3178806 64 3422868 92.87%
Average Capacity 51459.9
GDP Regression 2001-2013
SUMMARY OUTPUT
Regression Statistics
Multiple R 0.43296011
R Square 0.18745445
Adjusted R Square-0.0833941
Standard Error7.11128865
Observations 9
ANOVA
df SS MS F Significance F
Regression 2 69.9996569 34.9998285 0.69210072 0.53646716
Residual 6 303.422557 50.5704262
Total 8 373.422214
Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% Lower 95.0% Upper 95.0%
Intercept 48.5215328 2.9887089 16.2349477 3.4748E-06 41.2084256 55.8346401 41.2084256 55.8346401
Stadium Cost -1.986E-09 1.6967E-09 -1.1703043 0.28625413 -6.137E-09 2.166E-09 -6.137E-09 2.166E-09
Employed 0.00012756 0.00011069 1.15240109 0.29299388 -0.0001433 0.00039841 -0.0001433 0.00039841
GDP Regression 2004-2010
SUMMARY OUTPUT
Regression Statistics
Multiple R 0.582886504
R Square 0.339756676
Adjusted R Square0.119675569
Standard Error7.815082141
Observations 9
ANOVA
df SS MS F Significance F
Regression 2 188.574223 94.2871113 1.54377938 0.28781409
Residual 6 366.453053 61.0755089
Total 8 555.027276
Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% Lower 95.0% Upper 95.0%
Intercept 26.61742425 3.28449691 8.10395778 0.00018938 18.5805498 34.6542987 18.5805498 34.6542987
Stadium Cost -3.1617E-09 1.8646E-09 -1.695616 0.1408897 -7.724E-09 1.4009E-09 -7.724E-09 1.4009E-09
Employed 0.000179828 0.00012164 1.4783003 0.18980555 -0.0001178 0.00047748 -0.0001178 0.00047748
GDP Regression 2001-2013
SUMMARY OUTPUT
Regression Statistics
Multiple R 0.694241048
R Square 0.481970633
Adjusted R Square0.309294177
Standard Error 9.277006973
Observations 9
ANOVA
df SS MS F Significance F
Regression 2 480.433423 240.216711 2.79117747 0.139015473
Residual 6 516.37715 86.0628584
Total 8 996.810573
Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% Lower 95.0% Upper 95.0%
Intercept 33.90130604 3.89890984 8.69507308 0.0001278 24.36101733 43.4415947 24.36101733 43.4415947
Stadium Cost -5.22607E-09 2.2134E-09 -2.3610673 0.05620208 -1.06422E-08 1.9001E-10 -1.06422E-08 1.9001E-10
Employed 0.000321316 0.0001444 2.22517758 0.06771372 -3.20185E-05 0.00067465 -3.20185E-05 0.00067465
Political Changes
By Province (votes won and %) 2004 (#) 2004 (%) 2009 (#) 2009 (%) 2014 (#) 2014 (%) Diff 2004-09 Diff 2009-14 Diff 2004-14
Eastern Cape 1806221 79.311 1609926 69.705 15887338 70.753 -9.606 1.048 -8.558
Free State 838583 82.05 756287 71.9 7211226 69.719 -10.15 -2.181 -12.331
Gauteng 2408821 68.731 2814277 64.761 2522012 54.919 -3.97 -9.842 -13.812
KwaZulu-Natal 1312767 47.475 2256248 63.966 2530827 65.314 16.491 1.348 17.839
Limpopo 1487168 89.718 1319659 85.814 1202905 78.974 -3.904 -6.84 -10.744
Mpumalanga 979155 86.338 1152698 85.814 1091642 78.796 -0.524 -7.018 -7.542
Northern Cape 222205 68.751 253264 61.101 278540 63.876 -7.65 2.775 -4.875
North West 1083254 81.832 822166 73.842 763804 67.792 -7.99 -6.05 -14.04
Western Cape 742741 46.276 666223 32.858 737219 34.002 -13.418 1.144 -12.274
Total 10880915 69.693 11650748 65.895 32225513 62.149 -3.798 -3.746 -7.544
Year Governance Score World Percentile Rank
2003 -0.31 35.68
2004 -0.13 40.29
2005 -0.16 40.78
2006 0.05 47.83
2007 0.22 50.72
2008 0.05 46.15
2009 -0.11 41.23
2010 -0.03 45.02
2011 0.02 48.82
2012 -0.03 43.13
2013 -0.05 45.02
2014 -0.015 40
2015 -0.21 39.52
2016 -0.14 40
2017 -0.27 35.71
Seat Regression Data 2009-2014
SUMMARY OUTPUT
Regression Statistics
Multiple R 0.50492132
R Square 0.25494554
Adjusted R Square-0.1920871
Standard Error4.53083264
Observations 9
ANOVA
df SS MS F Significance F
Regression 3 35.1225017 11.7075006 0.57030627 0.65848716
Residual 5 102.642222 20.5284444
Total 8 137.764724
Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% Lower 95.0% Upper 95.0%
Intercept -1.8114849 6.31877585 -0.2866829 0.78585496 -18.054415 14.4314455 -18.05441532 14.4314455
GDP Change from 2009-2013-0.1539615 0.51209334 -0.3006513 0.7757804 -1.4703394 1.16241633 -1.470339366 1.16241633
Stadium Cost 1.1591E-09 1.2587E-09 0.9208522 0.39937874 -2.077E-09 4.3948E-09 -2.07656E-09 4.3948E-09
Employed -7.638E-05 8.2253E-05 -0.9286526 0.39569089 -0.0002878 0.00013505 -0.000287823 0.00013505
SUMMARY OUTPUT
Regression Statistics
Multiple R 0.32614871
R Square 0.10637298
Adjusted R Square-0.4298032
Standard Error10.4053694
Observations 9
ANOVA
df SS MS F Significance F
Regression 3 64.4406685 21.4802228 0.19839183 0.89326517
Residual 5 541.358562 108.271712
Total 8 605.79923
Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% Lower 95.0% Upper 95.0%
Intercept -13.624979 15.0730341 -0.9039308 0.40747262 -52.371447 25.1214883 -52.371447 25.1214883
Stadium Cost 2.0377E-09 2.9137E-09 0.69936416 0.51551371 -5.452E-09 9.5275E-09 -5.4521E-09 9.5275E-09
Employed -0.0001199 0.00018253 -0.6568809 0.54028438 -0.0005891 0.0003493 -0.0005891 0.0003493
GDP Change from 2004-20090.41135615 0.63918499 0.64356354 0.54820981 -1.2317212 2.05443347 -1.23172116 2.05443347
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